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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Divergence of Opinions, Short Sales, and Asset Prices. (August 2006) 
Bilal Erturk, B.S., Bilkent University; 
M.S., Mississippi State University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Ekkehart Boehmer 
Dr. Sorin M. Sorescu 
 
 
 
Prior research has established that stocks with high dispersion of earnings 
forecasts or short interest are associated with low subsequent returns. Assuming 
dispersion of forecasts is a proxy for divergence of opinions and short interest is a proxy 
for short selling constraints, these results have been traditionally attributed to correction 
for overpricing created by binding short selling constraints. This argument is provided by 
Miller (1977), and states that prices reflect an optimistic view when investors with 
pessimistic views can not trade due to short selling constraints, and that the more 
opinions diverge, the more stocks become overpriced. I test whether dispersion of 
forecasts exacerbates overpricing, but find evidence contrary to Miller’s theory.  When 
dispersion of forecasts increases, prices decrease. I offer an explanation based on 
analysts’ reluctance to quickly revise their forecasts downward. I show that some 
analysts’ sluggish response to bad news results in dispersion of forecasts. The inertia in 
downward forecast revisions also leads to market underreaction to bad news. Therefore, 
the negative relationship between dispersion and subsequent returns may be attributable 
to analysts’ sluggish response to bad news. I also examine the return predictability of 
firms with high short interest and low institutional ownership. Short interest seems to 
predict not only future stock returns but also future earnings news, especially for firms 
with lower institutional ownership. Therefore, the return predictability of short interest 
seems to be associated with value relevant information short sellers seem to have 
gathered. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior studies find stock return patterns, which seem consistent with short sale 
constraints. A set of studies that examine the relationship between dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts, short interest and subsequent stock returns find that stocks with high dispersion 
of forecasts or high short interest earn lower future returns. Diether et al. (2002) and 
Boehme et al. (2005) contend that stocks with high divergence of opinions would be 
overpriced due to short selling constraints. Interpreting short interest as shorting demand 
and institutional ownership as shorting supply, Asquith et al. (2005) argue that stocks 
with high shorting demand and low supply would be overpriced resulting in lower future 
returns. Therefore, Asquith et al. (2005), Diether et al. (2002), and Boehme et al. (2005) 
argue that the empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that short selling constraints 
cause overpricing. 
The argument for short selling constraints was provided by Miller (1977), and 
states that marginal investor is an optimist; therefore, prices are greater than the 
consensus value. The argument’s main point is that prices reflect optimistic view when 
investors with pessimistic views can not trade due to short selling constraints and that the 
more opinions diverge, the more stocks become overpriced. 
In this study, I offer alternative explanations for the above empirical findings and 
demonstrate some evidence, which suggests that the findings may also be consistent with 
these explanations. Firstly, analysts are under pressure to be optimistic and reluctant to 
respond to bad news. Sluggish response of optimistic analysts to poorly performing firms 
results in increased dispersion; therefore, dispersion predicts low future returns. So, 
dispersion effect may be a consequence of sluggish downward forecast revisions. 
Secondly, I find that short interest is informative not only for future stock returns but also 
for future earnings surprises, especially when institutional ownership is low. As a result, 
return predictability of short interest seems to be associated with value relevant 
information short sellers seem to have gathered.1
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of The Journal of Finance. 
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CHAPTER II 
DISPERSION OF FORECASTS AND STOCK RETURNS 
 
A. Introduction 
Investors hold different opinions on a variety of economic variables1. The 
majority of theoretical papers view the degree by which investors disagree as a risk 
factor, and therefore, predict a positive relationship between divergence of opinions and 
asset returns2. However, recent empirical papers find that stocks which are associated 
with higher divergence of opinions earn, on average, lower subsequent returns.3 This 
result is interpreted to be consistent with two arguments. The first, set forth by Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescsu (2005), provides 
empirical evidence consistent with Miller (1977) argument. Miller suggests that 
whenever there is divergence of opinions among investors and short selling constraints 
bind, pessimistic investors will be absent from the market while optimistic investors will 
push stock prices up causing overvaluation. The greater the divergence of opinions, the 
greater the upward bias in stock prices. Therefore, this upward bias in stock prices is 
assumed to lead to lower future returns in the subsequent correction periods. The second 
interpretation views differences of opinion as a proxy for unpriced information risk. 
Considering equity of a levered firm as an option on the assets of the firm, Johnson 
(2004) argues that equity prices should increase and expected returns should decrease 
with the level of idiosyncratic asset risk. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between dispersion 
of analysts’ forecasts and asset prices (which I’ll call dispersion effect hereafter) in two 
directions. First, using dispersion of earnings forecasts to proxy for divergence of 
opinions, I empirically show that stock prices move in the opposite direction of what 
Miller predicts: when dispersion of forecasts increases, prices decrease. However, 
                                                 
1 For example, Welch (2000) reports economists’ view on the equity risk premium that ranges from 2% for 
the pessimists to 13% for the optimists, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) report substantial variation 
in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts. 
2 An extensive discussion of these theories is provided later in the literature review section. 
3 For example, Diether et al. (2002) and Boehme et al.  (2005) provide evidence that stocks with higher 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts earn lower returns. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) find that stocks 
whose change in breadth (proportion of investors with long positions) in the prior quarter is the lowest 
underperform those whose change in breadth is the highest. 
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according to Miller (1977), the more opinions diverge, the more stocks may become 
overpriced. As a result, Miller’s argument doesn’t seem a plausible explanation of the 
robust finding that dispersion of analysts’ forecasts predicts lower returns. Second, I offer 
an alternative explanation based on some analysts’ reluctance to quickly incorporate 
negative information into their forecasts. I argue that when some analysts are more 
sluggish than others to respond to bad news, this results in increased dispersion of 
forecasts. I show that firms with recent negative performance exhibit high dispersion 
compared to others and that increase in dispersion is associated with downward revision 
of the consensus estimate. Also, the inertia in downward consensus forecast revisions 
leads to market underreaction to bad news, which in turn, predicts lower subsequent 
returns. The negative relationship between dispersion of forecasts and subsequent returns 
may be, in part, attributable to dispersion created due to some analysts’ sluggish response 
to bad news as the market do not fully recognize incomplete response of analysts to 
negative news. 
Firstly, I investigate the interpretation set forth by Diether et al. (2002) and 
Boehme et al. (2005) for the dispersion effect. The argument provided by Miller applies 
to the relationship between differences of opinion and prices, not returns. According to 
Miller, overpricing is directly proportional to the level of opinion divergence. In order to 
observe a negative relationship between differences of opinion and subsequent returns, 
overpricing should be corrected via convergence of opinions in the future. Price 
correction should be associated with the resolution of disagreement. If disagreement 
about the stock value does not diminish, future returns will not be abnormally low. 
Therefore, Miller implies that, over the same period, changes in dispersion of opinions 
and returns should be positively correlated. In his own words:  
“… as long as a minority of potential investors can absorb the issue, an increase 
in the divergence of opinion will increase the market clearing price….. On the other 
hand, if the divergence of opinion decreases, ….. the market clearing price falls.” (p. 
1153) 
I examine the predictions of Miller (1977) in a dynamic setting when dispersion 
of forecasts is used to proxy for divergence of opinions, and find that Miller’s argument 
is not consistent with the data. I investigate the cross-sectional correlation between 
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changes in dispersion and returns, and find that, in fact, changes in dispersion are 
negatively correlated with contemporaneous returns. When I sort stocks into five 
portfolios based on each firm’s monthly change in dispersion and compare with the 
returns in the same period, I find that stocks in the top portfolio (that experience increase 
in dispersion) underperform stocks in the bottom portfolio (that experience decrease in 
dispersion) by 0.94% monthly. The results hold after controlling for size, book to market, 
and momentum effects. This finding is not consistent with Miller’s prediction mentioned 
above since an increase in dispersion does not increase prices if dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts is used to proxy for divergence of opinions. 
 Secondly, I provide a new approach to dispersion effect based on (dis)incentives 
that some analysts face while reporting their forecasts. Prior research have documented 
that analysts’ forecasts are overly optimistic (e.g. Ackert and Hunter (1994), Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999), De Bondt and Thaler (1990), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) 
among others). Analysts’ positive bias is generally attributed to conflicts of interest due 
to brokerage houses’ investment banking relationships (Michaely and Womack (1999), 
and Ackert and Hunter (1994)) or analysts’ efforts to maintain good relations with the 
firm management in order to have access to management’s private information (Francis 
and Philbrick (1993) and Lim (2001)). 
The positive bias of analysts is found to be mostly due to analysts’ reluctant 
response to poorly performing firms. Analysts may have disincentives to be the front 
runner with the bad news because this might harm the relations with the management.  
Some analysts may find it in their best interest to wait for additional confirmation of poor 
earnings before slowly revising their estimates downwards. Therefore, some analysts may 
refrain from fully revising their estimates downwards for poorly performing firms and act 
sluggishly when it comes to downward revisions (see Francis and Philbrick (1993), Lim 
(2001), Chan et al. (1996), and Conrad et al. (2005)). If some analysts are sluggish in 
responding to bad news, consensus downward revisions may be insufficient too (Elliot et 
al. (1995)), which suggests that on average analysts underreact to bad news.  
Although analysts are, on average, optimistic and reluctant to downward 
revisions, there are differences across analysts in terms of their forecast accuracy and 
responsiveness to bad news. For example, Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols 
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(1998), and Michaely and Womack (1999) document that analysts who follow firms that 
are also investment banking clients of their firms are more optimistic in their forecasts 
relative to other analysts. Experienced analysts (Mikhail et al. (2003b)) and “All 
American” analysts (Stickel (1992)) are found to have more accurate forecasts and less 
underreaction to prior earnings information. They also supply forecasts more often than 
other analysts. Zhang (2005) report that about half of the analysts revise their forecasts 
within three trading days after earnings announcements, whereas the other half take more 
than a month to update their forecasts. Since some analysts are more reluctant to revise 
their forecasts downward than others and some are quicker in terms of updating forecasts, 
we would observe two consequences of these behaviors. Not only revision in consensus 
estimates would be insufficient, but also dispersion may be observed as a consequence of 
some analysts’ reluctance to downgrade for poorly performing firms. For the simplest 
example, think of a firm followed by two analysts. When negative information comes in 
for the firm, the optimistic analyst may want to wait for additional confirmation to revise 
her forecast while the other downgrades the firm. This would consequently increase the 
dispersion of forecasts. 
 These observations are particularly important since analysts’ behaviors become 
relevant for asset pricing as the evidence shows that investors rely on analysts’ forecasts 
for price discovery (Dechow and Soan (1997), and Dechow et al. (2000)). Mikhail et al. 
(2003a) find that post earnings announcement drift associated with firms with more 
experienced analysts following is lower because experienced analysts have more accurate 
forecasts. The authors suggest that the efficiency of a firm’s stock price is, in part, 
affected by the analysts’ forecast accuracy. Michaely and Womack (1999) show that long 
run performance of firms recommended by underwriter analysts are significantly worse 
than those of firms recommended by other analysts. Similarly, the significance of 
analysts’ actions on stock prices are documented by Zhang (2005) who finds that post-
earnings announcement drift is significantly lower when the analysts following the firm 
are quicker in terms of updating their forecasts. She concludes that the speed at which 
analysts incorporate new information into their forecasts is closely related to market 
underreaction to earnings announcements. Significant price drifts are also found after 
consensus forecast revisions especially for firms with poor earnings performance (Chan 
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et al. (1996)). Price drifts may occur if analysts are especially slow in revising their 
estimates downward, and in turn, the inertia in revising forecasts may prevent the market 
to incorporate new information in a timely fashion. The above empirical results 
demonstrate that analysts’ forecasts and recommendations are part of the information set 
market participants use for price discovery; however, it seems that investors do not fully 
recognize and correct for possible biases of analysts’ behaviors. 
In this paper, I propose that due to heterogeneity among analysts’ behaviors, after 
negative news about a firm, if some analysts update their forecasts downward and others 
act reluctantly and refrain from revising their forecasts downward, forecasts may become 
more dispersed. We would observe high dispersion for firms with recent poor 
performance or, put differently, increase in dispersion would be associated with 
downward revision of the consensus estimate. When I use past return or earnings 
performance to determine whether there was good or bad news about the firm, I 
empirically confirm that poorly performing firms have high dispersion of forecasts 
compared to others. Moreover, I find that dispersion and standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts increase following poor performance. This result also sheds some light on why 
we observe lower returns when dispersion increases as found above which is not 
consistent with Miller (1977) explanation. As indicated by previous research, since 
investors may not recognize and fully correct for analysts’ insufficient response to bad 
news, market reaction to bad news might be incomplete. Therefore, we would empirically 
observe continuation of low returns for poorly performing firms with high dispersion of 
forecasts. The argument set forth here asserts that the negative relationship between 
dispersion and subsequent returns may be in part attributable to dispersion of forecasts 
created due to some analysts’ sluggish response to bad news and, in turn, insufficient 
revision of the consensus estimate. Therefore, the return differential between high 
dispersion and low dispersion stocks should be most pronounced for firms with recent 
poor performance. On the other hand, dispersion of forecasts should not predict low 
returns for firms with good performance. 
Consistent with this argument, I find that only among firms that have negative 
performance in the recent past (three or six months), high dispersion stocks underperform 
low dispersion stocks. For example, among poorly performing firms, high dispersion 
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stocks underperform low dispersion stocks by 1.07% monthly; however, among firms 
with good performance, the return differential is an insignificant 0.43%. Additionally, 
cross-sectional regressions of return show that the interaction variable between dispersion 
and recent past performance is significantly negative, which suggests that the dispersion 
effect is most pronounced for poorly performing firms. 
This paper is related to Scherbina (2004), which links optimistic bias of earnings 
to dispersion of forecasts. Scherbina (2004) calculates a measure of bias in earnings 
assuming that when an analyst does not post a forecast, her estimate is one cent below the 
lowest existing estimate. She finds that the positive bias predicts lower future returns. 
However, this paper differs in major respects. First, while Scherbina assumes that when 
an analyst has a negative opinion, she might not report at all, this paper proposes that an 
analyst might keep her previous estimate and act sluggishly to change it downward4. 
Second, while Scherbina takes dispersion of forecasts as given, this paper provides an 
explanation about how dispersion may occur due to non-synchronous response of 
analysts to bad news. Third, this paper’s implications regarding the dispersion effect do 
not depend on analysts dropping out from the data. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section B reviews theoretical and empirical 
arguments explaining the relationship between differences of opinion and stock returns. 
Section C shows the data, the methodology and procedure of forming portfolios on the 
basis of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. Section D presents our results where we test 
Miller’s predictions Section E describes analysts’ biases and their reactions toward 
positive versus negative news, and cross-sectional explanations of dispersion of opinions. 
Section F describes how analysts’ biased behaviors may have implications for asset 
prices. 
 
B. Differences of Opinion: A Literature Review 
In this section, I provide a brief literature review on the implications of 
divergence of opinions on asset prices, and show some empirical evidence, which 
suggests that firms with high dispersion of forecasts earn lower subsequent returns. In a 
                                                 
4 The assumption in this paper seems more reasonable since IBES keeps the previous estimate even if an 
analyst chooses not to report in a particular month. 
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world of heterogeneous beliefs, asset prices may be affected by the consensus of the 
market as well as by the degree by which investors disagree about the stochastic 
properties of cash flows. Since means cannot be estimated without error from observed 
returns, this introduces the possibility of heterogeneous expectations among investors. 
Many theoretical papers find that differences of opinion should be a priced risk factor. 
Williams (1977) shows a positive association between future stock returns and 
differences of opinion. He asserts that the difficulty in assessing the probability 
distribution of stock return payoffs should have pricing implications. When investors tend 
to hold different subjective opinions about stocks’ future return payoffs, investors will 
demand high rates of return in order to invest, and its impact on prices should be 
compounded by the degree of disagreement.  
If we assume perfect capital markets and ignore short selling constraints, the 
cross-sectional variation of investors’ expectations always emerge as a risk factor in 
theoretical models. For example, in Basak’s (2004) Bayesian learning framework, the 
standard consumption CAPM type expression obtains, with the risk premium of a 
security replaced by a risk-tolerance-weighted average of each investor’s perceived risk 
premium. David (2004) constructs a general equilibrium exchange economy in which 
each agent faces the risk of trading loss if prices move more in line with the beliefs of 
other agents. As a result, the premium agents demand to hold stocks is larger at times of 
higher dispersion of beliefs. In Varian’s (1985) Arrow-Debreu model, in general, an asset 
with more dispersed subjective probabilities will have a lower price than an asset with 
less dispersed subjective probabilities. Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005) use a 
constant dividend growth model to extrapolate return forecasts. They show that 
dispersion of earnings forecasts is a priced factor when they substitute earnings forecast 
in for expected future dividend and long-term earnings forecast for the growth of 
dividends to estimate expected future returns. Lastly, Qu, Starks, and Yan (2004) show 
that portfolios with higher levels of dispersion have more exposure to Fama-French three 
factors. 
The theoretical rational expectations models that acknowledge short selling 
constraints also do not predict a consistent overpricing. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) 
suggest that restrictions on short sales drive relatively uninformed traders out of the pool 
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of shorts more so than it drives out relatively informed traders. The short positions in the 
presence of short selling constraints constitute a stronger signal to the market which in 
turn is incorporated into investors’ expectations. These predictions imply the assumption 
that rational investors will try to adapt to the market conditions and thus eliminate 
mispricing. Moreover, in a dynamic general equilibrium economy with heterogeneous 
beliefs, Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2005) find that stocks prices are more depressed in an 
economy with short sale constraints compared to one without short sale constraints. In 
their model, a large increase in interest rates more than offsets the decrease in risk 
premium and depresses the stock prices when short sale constraints are introduced. 
 Recent empirical research uses several proxies for differences of opinion inherent 
in the market, and finds that asset returns are decreasing in differences of opinion. For 
instance, the pricing factor that Anderson et al. (2005) construct from disagreement 
among analysts’ earnings forecasts has a negative premium.  Chen, Hong and Stein 
(2002) argue that when breadth of ownership is low (when few mutual funds have long 
positions), this signals that short sales constraint is binding tightly and that prices are high 
relative to fundamentals. They find that the stocks whose change in breadth in the prior 
quarter is the lowest underperform those in the top change in breadth decile by 6.38% in 
the first 12 months. However, their results are questionable if mutual fund managers have 
better stock picking skills than individuals, and if further rounds of buying push the price 
up in subsequent quarter via price pressure effect. Chen et al. (2002) lend some support to 
this criticism with the finding that when funds are net buyers of a stock, the stock tends to 
outperform over the next year, and vice versa.  
 Additional evidence is provided by Diether et al. (2002) and Boehme et al. (2005) 
who use dispersion in analysts’ earning forecasts as a proxy for differences of opinion. 
Diether et al. (2002) find that stocks with high dispersion of forecasts underperform 
stocks with low dispersion by 0.79% per month. Moreover, Boehme et al. (2005), using 
existing short interest level to proxy for short selling constraints, demonstrate that 
dispersion effect is more pronounced among short sale constrained firms. Both papers 
argue that the evidence is consistent with the Miller (1977) hypothesis, which states that 
prices reflect optimistic view when investors with pessimistic views can not trade due to 
short selling constraints. Therefore, the bigger the disagreements about a stock’s value, 
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the higher the market price relative to the true value of the stock, and the lower its future 
returns. In addition, Sadka and Scherbina (2006) show that the mispricing is mostly 
concentrated on the less liquid stocks. On the other hand, Scherbina (2001) reports some 
results inconsistent with the short selling constraints argument. She finds that the return 
differential between low and high dispersion stocks is still significant for the stocks in 
S&P 500 index, which should be very cheap to short sell. Johnson (2004) has an 
alternative approach to dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. He views it as uncertainty about 
the firm value, and argues that it is a non-systematic risk, therefore should not be priced. 
If we consider equity of a levered firm as a call option on the firs assets, Johnson (2004) 
shows that option value of equity should increase and expected equity returns should 
decrease with the idiosyncratic asset risk. As a result, there may be other factors that 
explain the relation between dispersion and subsequent stock returns. 
 
C. Data and Methodology 
This section explains the data and portfolio construction methods used. I use three 
data sources for this paper. Return and volume data are drawn from the monthly stock file 
of the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). Accounting data are taken from 
COMPUSTAT annual files. The analysis on financial analysts’ earnings estimates is 
obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Specifically, I use 
“unadjusted” U.S. Summary History datasets from I/B/E/S in order to be free of any 
biases due to stock splits5. The Summary History dataset contains the summary statistics 
on analyst forecasts of earnings per share, such as the number, mean and standard 
deviation values. These variables are calculated according to all outstanding forecasts as 
of the third Thursday of each month. I choose the time period of January 1983 through 
December 2001 for analysis in this paper so that the results are comparable to those of 
Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004). Table I presents summary statistics. 
I follow Diether et al. (2002) by employing a portfolio-based analysis and 
assigning stocks to portfolios based on firm characteristics in order to reach conclusions 
for these classes of stocks. This is a standard approach in asset pricing to reduce the  
 
                                                 
5 A more detailed discussion of the bias due to stock splits is provided by Diether et al. (2002). 
 11
Table I 
Summary Statistics on Analyst Coverage 
The sample contains NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks during the period from January 1983 to December 
2001. Stocks are included in the sample if it has one earnings estimate, is followed by two or more analysts, 
and has a price greater than five dollars. Data on analyst forecasts are from Summary I/B/E/S File. 
Coverage is the number of analysts issuing a forecast in a given month. Dispersion is the ratio between the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the absolute value of the mean of the forecasts. Size 
is the market value of equity.  
      
Year Number 
of Firms 
Mean 
coverage 
Median 
coverage 
Mean size Median 
size 
Mean 
dispersion 
Median 
Dispersion 
1983 1641 8.87 7 829.45 264.58 0.33 0.07 
1984 2008 8.99 7 726.88 217.58 0.24 0.06 
1985 2091 9.69 7 861.06 240.17 0.25 0.06 
1986 2125 9.97 7 1,065.58 273.1 0.29 0.07 
1987 2192 9.81 7 1,221.67 290.19 0.29 0.07 
1988 2176 10.14 7 1,163.91 279.95 0.21 0.06 
1989 2258 10.23 7 1,290.6 271.69 0.22 0.05 
1990 2156 10.14 7 1,327.9 256.17 0.19 0.06 
1991 2188 9.75 7 1,530.71 302.95 0.21 0.06 
1992 2331 9.11 6 1,594.53 323.16 0.21 0.05 
1993 2691 8.97 6 1,604.68 331.77 0.16 0.05 
1994 2991 8.41 5 1,469.09 292.62 0.16 0.04 
1995 3132 8.12 5 1,681.43 316.07 0.14 0.04 
1996 3491 7.62 5 1,922.80 349.74 0.16 0.04 
1997 3741 7.37 5 2,333.42 384.44 0.14 0.03 
1998 3658 7.57 5 2,946.35 427.21 0.14 0.03 
1999 3392 8.09 6 3,772.91 474.44 0.16 0.03 
2000 3104 8.12 6 4,852.49 643.87 0.14 0.03 
2001 2625 8.17 6 4,808.63 724.35 0.15 0.03 
 
 
variability in returns or measurement errors. I include the annual earnings estimates that 
are made for the current fiscal year end if at least two analysts are following the firm. I 
exclude stocks with share price lower than five dollars in order to reduce any bias in 
results that can be caused by small illiquid stocks or by bid-ask bounce. I use a measure 
of dispersion in analyst forecasts of earnings per share as a proxy for differences of 
opinion about a firm’s prospects.  For each month, the coefficient of variation of analysts’ 
earnings estimates for the fiscal year end is calculated as the standard deviation of 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecasts. For portfolios sorted on 
dispersion, if the mean earnings forecast is zero, then I assign the stock to the highest 
dispersion category. For robustness checks, I run the analysis excluding observations 
with mean earnings forecast of zero. The results are virtually identical. I also use book  
value of equity per share as an alternative way to scale the standard deviation of earnings 
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Table II 
Cross-sectional Explanations of Dispersion 
This table represents the level of dispersion based on average firm characteristics. The period covered is 
January 1983 to December 2001. Stocks are included in the Summary History I/B/E/S File that have at 
least two analyst coverage and have price greater than or equal to five dollars. Each month, stocks are 
sorted into five groups based on specific firm characteristics (size, B/M, R&D, Dividends per share, return 
momentum, and change in consensus forecast as calculated from the past six months). The dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts is presented for each portfolio. Dispersion is defined as the ratio between the standard 
deviation and the absolute value of the mean forecasts of earnings per share for the current fiscal year end.  
 
  Mean Level of Dispersion   
 Size B/M Momentum R&D Dividends Forecast 
Change 
Portfolio1 
(low) 
0.54 0.26 0.53 0.22 0.60 0.47 
 0.34 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.40 0.14 
 0.27 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.07 
 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.17 0.07 
Portfolio5 
(high) 
0.13 0.56 0.29 0.72 0.11 0.22 
 
 
forecasts. This alternative specification does not significantly affect our results either.6 To 
minimize problems associated with outliers and non-linearity, I follow Johnson (2004) to 
use percentile rank for dispersion in cross-sectional regressions.  
 I employ portfolio approach and Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions in order to demonstrate the relationship between dispersion of opinions, firm 
characteristics, and subsequent returns. I use return momentum and earnings momentum 
to determine whether a particular firm is associated with good or bad news during the 
recent past (3-6 months). Momentum is calculated as past returns from month t-7 to t-2. I 
follow Chan et al. (1996) to calculate earnings momentum using changes in analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings.  
∑
= −−
−−− −=
n
m mit
mitmit
it P
FF
nREV
0 1,
1,,)(   (1) 
                                                 
6 The results under alternative specifications of excluding observations with zero mean earnings forecast 
and using book value of equity per share for scaling are available upon request. 
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I define REV(n), n-month moving average of past changes in analysts’ earning forecasts. 
Fit is the consensus forecast in month t of firm i’s earnings for the current fiscal year. The 
monthly consensus forecast revisions are scaled by the prior month’s stock price. 
 Firm size is calculated each month as the number of shares outstanding times 
price per share. B/M ratio is obtained by dividing the book value of equity from the 
previous fiscal year to the market value of equity at the end of each month, so the B/M 
ratio is updated each month. The accounting data such as R&D expenses and dividends 
per share are obtained from the previous fiscal year end of the observed dispersion 
variable. For the portfolio analysis, each month I assign stocks into five quintiles 
depending on each of the cross-sectional firm characteristics. Then, I compare the level 
of dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts across these portfolios. Table II demonstrates 
a number of stylized facts about dispersion. First, I find that firms that may be 
characterized with greater information asymmetry have higher dispersion of forecasts. 
For example, smaller firms, firms with high R&D expenses and low dividends per share 
are associated with high dispersion. Diether et al. (2002) also report similar results 
regarding size. These findings are consistent with the notion that financial analysts 
disagree more about firms, which have relatively narrower information sets available to 
the public (Barron et al. (1998)). Second, I also document significant relationship 
between dispersion and performance measures. It seems financial analysts disagree more 
about poorly performing firms. Stocks with negative earnings and return momentum, and 
low dividend per share seem to exhibit high dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.  Finally, 
stocks with high B/M also exhibit higher dispersion. This might sound surprising since 
analysts would be expected to disagree more about growth stocks, which have more 
intangible value. Instead distressed firms or firms that have done poorly in the past have 
more dispersed forecasts. Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004) confirm the findings 
regarding B/M and momentum. However, they don’t elaborate on this finding, which is a 
key argument in this paper. 
  I replicate the findings of Diether et al. (2002), and confirm that high dispersion 
stocks exhibit lower subsequent returns. Each month, I sort stocks into five quintiles  
based on dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as of the previous month. I calculate 
monthly portfolio returns as the equal-weighted average of the returns of all the stocks in  
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Table III 
Mean Portfolio Returns Based on Dispersion in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
This table represents average monthly returns of dispersion portfolios. The period covered is January 1983 
to December 2001. Stocks are included in the Summary History I/B/E/S File that have at least two analyst 
coverage and have price greater than or equal to five dollars. Each month, stocks are sorted into five groups 
based on the level of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for the previous month. Dispersion is 
defined as the ratio between the standard deviation and the absolute value of the mean forecasts of earnings 
per share for the current fiscal year end. Stocks with a mean forecast of zero are assigned to the highest 
dispersion portfolio. t-statistics are calculated according to robust standard errors. a, b, c shows statistical 
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Dispersion Mean Returns 
  Holding Period 
Dispersion 
Quintiles 
 1-month 3-month 6-month January Only 
D 1 (low) 0.012 1.48 1.43 1.42 2.40 
D 2 0.028 1.35 1.33 1.32 2.91 
D 3 0.049 1.24 1.17 1.17 3.14 
D 4 0.098 1.13 1.05 1.06 3.74 
D 5 (high) 0.804 0.73 0.76 0.79 4.67 
      
Low – High 0.792a 0.75b 0.67b 0.63b -2.27b 
t-statistic 15.12 2.38 2.75 2.51 2.47 
 
 Mean Returns 
 80s 90s 
Dispersion 
Quintiles 
January Only All Months January 
Only 
All Months 
D 1 (low) 3.48 1.51 1.64 1.45 
D 2 3.39 1.40 2.37 1.31 
D 3 3.44 1.23 2.53 1.22 
D 4 3.63 0.98 3.25 1.18 
D 5 (high) 4.17 0.53 4.35 0.82 
     
Low – High -0.69 0.98a -2.71b 0.63 
t-statistic 0.93 3.24 2.11 1.58 
 
 
the portfolio, and then compare average returns across portfolios sorted on dispersion. A 
zero investment strategy, which buys low dispersion stocks and sells high dispersion 
stocks, earns 0.75% per month. Indeed, high dispersion stocks yield significantly lower 
subsequent returns than low dispersion stocks, which is apparently in contradiction with 
any risk-based argument for differences of opinion. Holding periods longer than one 
month are also shown in Table III. The return of zero investment strategy monotonically 
declines with the holding period as reported by Diether et al. (2002). Moreover, I report 
January returns of portfolios sorted on dispersion. Interestingly contrary to the rest of the 
year, high dispersion stocks earn higher returns in January. Since it’s found that loser 
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stocks exhibit high dispersion, this finding is consistent with the earlier research, which 
suggests that loser stocks outperform others in January unlike the rest of the year. 
 
D. The Effect of Changes in Dispersion on Stock Returns 
 In this section, I present a test of Miller’s (1977) argument as an explanation for 
why high dispersion stocks earn lower returns. The empirical evidence in Diether et al. 
(2002) and Boehme et al. (2005) seems consistent with Miller (1977); assuming 
dispersion of forecasts is an unbiased measure of disagreement in the market. However, 
with a more direct test, I demonstrate that stock price movements in relation with 
dispersion of opinions are inconsistent with Miller’s predictions since increase in 
dispersion of opinions is associated with decrease in prices. 
The primary argument set forth by Miller actually applies to the relationship 
between differences of opinion and stock prices. He indicates that constraining pessimists 
without constraining optimists results in an upward bias in stock prices. The assertion that 
high dispersion stocks will underperform low dispersion stocks has an implicit 
assumption regarding convergence of opinions. Within the framework of Miller’s 
argument in order the high dispersion stocks to underperform; convergence of prices 
down to fundamental values should be due to a decrease in divergence of opinions. When 
the uncertainty about the stock value is resolved, upward bias in prices fades away, 
leading to low returns on the high dispersion stocks. Otherwise, if the divergence of 
opinions remains the same, prices would continue to stay upwardly biased leading to no 
relation between divergence of opinions and stock returns. Therefore, the translation of 
Miller’s overpricing argument into returns would suggest that decrease in dispersion 
should be associated with lower returns. According to Miller, stocks would underperform 
if opinions converge from one period to the next; and stocks would overperform if 
opinions further diverge since the stocks would become even more overpriced in the next 
period. If differences of opinion exacerbate overpricing, greater dispersion would 
generate greater overpricing. More specifically, a decrease in dispersion should generate 
lower returns, and an increase in dispersion should generate higher returns.  
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Table IV 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Change in Dispersion and Standard Deviation of 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts. 
This table presents average monthly returns of portfolios sorted on change in dispersion and change in 
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts. Also, each month, stocks are sorted into five groups by the level 
of dispersion, and stocks in each of these groups are then sorted into five additional groups based on change 
in dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. The period covered is January 1983 to December 2001. 
Changes in dispersion and standard deviation of forecasts are calculated contemporaneously with the 
returns. t-statistics are calculated according to robust standard errors. a, b, c shows statistical significance at 
the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Returns 
 ∆StdDev ∆ Dispersion 
 All Firms All 
Firms 
D1 
(Low) D2 D3 D4 
D5 
(High) 
Portfolio1 (low) 1.38 1.31 1.76 1.63 1.62 1.46 1.08 
Portfolio2 1.43 1.72 1.99 1.81 1.74 1.57 1.81 
Portfolio3 1.27 1.25 1.56 1.46 1.25 1.16 0.47 
Portfolio4 1.21 1.11 1.31 1.15 1.17 1.25 0.69 
Portfolio5 (high) 0.64 0.37 0.85 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.17 
Low-High 0.74a 0.94a 0.91a 1.25a 1.29a 1.20a 0.91a 
t-stat 8.33 7.28 2.13 5.38 6.77 6.85 5.30 
 
 
In order to test Miller (1977) argument, I calculate the changes in dispersion 
contemporaneously with the returns. Each month, I assign stocks into five quintiles based 
on the change in dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as of the same period that I 
obtain returns. Monthly portfolio returns are, again, calculated as the equal weighted 
average of the returns of all the stocks in the portfolio. Table IV shows that this sort 
produces a strong negative relation between average returns and change in dispersion. 
The stocks in the highest change in dispersion portfolio underperform those in the lowest 
change in dispersion portfolio by 0.94% per month. The portfolio results based on the 
percentage change in standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts also yield similar results. 
Stocks in the highest change in standard deviation portfolio experience lower returns than 
those in the lowest change in standard deviation portfolio by 0.74% per month. So, the 
data suggest that an increase in dispersion is actually associated with lower returns, and a 
decrease in dispersion with higher returns. This result is, in fact, the opposite of Miller 
(1977) prediction. I also present results of portfolios sorted on two-dimensions, first on 
the level of dispersion then on the change in dispersion. These results also suggest that, 
conditioning on the level of dispersion, stocks that experience an increase in dispersion  
 
Table V 
Time-series and Cross-sectional Regressions of Stock Returns on Change in Dispersion, Change in Standard Deviation of 
Analysts’ Forecasts, Size, B/M, and Momentum. 
 
Panel A presents Fama-MacBeth regressions. Regressions include firm observations from January 1983 until December 2001. In each month, stock returns are 
regressed on log of size (market capitalization as of the previous month), log of B/M (book value of equity divided by market value of equity as of the previous 
month), momentum (past six months’ return), log of dispersion (the ratio between the standard deviation and the absolute value of the mean forecasts of earnings 
per share), consensus forecast revision for past six months(Rev6), and change in dispersion or standard deviation of forecasts contemporaneously measured with 
returns. Panel B presents time-series regressions of return on Fama-French 3-factors, dispersion, and standard deviation of forecasts as well as their changes 
contemporaneously with stock returns. Time-series regressions are run on individual stocks with at least five years of data. Regression coefficients from each 
regression are, then, averaged on the cross-section of firms. t-stats in parentheses are calculated according to robust standard errors. p-values for the median 
coefficients are presented in parentheses. a, b, c shows statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Return 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables  
Return Intercept Size B/M Momentum Disp2 Rev6 ∆Disp ∆StdDev R2 
 1.782b 0.002 0.412b 0.080a -0.009a 4.777a -0.135b  5.06% 
 (1.97) (0.03) (2.45) (3.96) (2.85) (3.18) (2.51)   
 1.966b -
0.006 
0.421b 0.079a -0.011a 4.925a  -2.979a 5.11% 
 (2.01) (0.1) (2.51) (3.95) (3.15) (3.29)  (7.78)  
 
Panel B: Time-series Regressions of Return 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables  
Return Intercept SMB MKTRF HML Disp1 ∆Disp StdDev ∆StdDev R2 
Mean 0.005a 0.542a 1.118a 0.296a 0.014c -0.033a   25.32% 
 (9.91) (37.83) (114.70) (9.96) (1.95) (2.97)    
 0.007a 0.545a 1.118a 0.297a   -0.014b -0.051a 25.28% 
 (13.23) (33.02) (112.77) (12.15)   (2.01) (5.15)  
Median 0.004a 0.486a 1.104a 0.412a -0.001 -0.007a   24.55% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.104) (0.000)    
 0.006a 0.486a 1.103a 0.420a   -0.002b -0.021a 24.56% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.04) (0.000)  
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yield returns lower than those that experience a decrease in dispersion. So, increase in 
dispersion does not further push prices up to cause overpricing.  
I also run cross-sectional and time-series regressions of stock returns on change in 
dispersion or standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts together with a number of control 
variables. Panel A of Table V reports Fama-MacBeth regressions. Controlling for size, 
B/M, six-month return and earnings momentum, and dispersion, the coefficients on 
change in dispersion and change in standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts are -0.135 
and -2.979, significant at the five and one percent levels, respectively. Negative 
coefficients suggest that increase in dispersion is associated with lower returns, which 
confirms the univariate tests. Additionally, for each firm, I run time-series regressions of 
return on changes in dispersion and changes in standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts 
controlling for Fama-French 3-factors, and dispersion. After estimating the regressions 
for each firm, I compute the mean and median of the coefficients from each regression. 
Panel B of Table V reports the results. Consistent with the cross-sectional results, mean 
and median of the coefficients for change in dispersion and change in standard deviation 
of forecasts from individual time-series regressions are significantly negative. These 
results also suggest that when a firm experiences increase in dispersion, its 
contemporaneous return is lower.  
As a result, the data does not seem to support Miller (1977) if we use dispersion 
of analysts’ forecasts to proxy for divergence of opinions; actually, the data suggest the 
opposite of Miller’s prediction since an increase in dispersion is associated with lower 
returns. These results seem consistent with argument that due to the analysts’ incentives 
explained in the following section, analysts’ forecast dispersion increases when firms 
exhibit poor performance; therefore, we empirically observe lower returns for firms that 
experience increase in dispersion. 
 
E. Analysts’ Forecast Revisions and Dispersion 
 In this section, I will examine how an increase in dispersion may be associated 
with poor firm performance. I argue that earnings forecasts may become more dispersed 
in the face of bad news due to analysts’ incentive structures as a possible mechanism. 
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Several researchers have documented that analyst forecasts are overly optimistic 
(Debondt and Thaler (1990), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), and Daniel et al. (2002) 
among others). As Michaely and Womack (1999), and Ackert and Hunter (1994) point 
out there is an implicit pressure on analysts to maintain positive opinions on a firm that is 
an investment banking client (or a potential client); therefore, the conflicts of interest due 
to brokerage houses’ investment banking relationships may result in positively biased 
recommendations. Hong and Kubik (2003) provide confirmatory evidence by finding 
that, controlling for accuracy, optimistic analysts are more likely to get jobs at more 
prestigious brokerage houses. For analysts following stocks that are underwritten by the 
analysts’ brokerage houses, job prospects depend less on accuracy and more on 
optimism. Maintaining good relations with the firm management in order to have access 
to management’s private information might be another reason for positively biased 
forecasts (see Francis and Philbrick (1993)). Lim (2001) models analysts’ forecasting 
where analysts’ objective function is to minimize forecast error. In this setting, analysts 
trade off positive bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy since 
management is a significant source of information. Therefore, Lim argues that optimal 
forecasts are positively biased.  
The positive biases of analysts are generally attributed to analysts’ response to 
poorly performing firms. The analysts seem to be sluggish in reflecting negative news 
into their forecasts. Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld (1992), and Dowen and Bauman (1995) 
demonstrate that analysts underreact to prior earnings information and that the 
overestimation bias in forecasts is most pronounced for firms that recently experienced 
negative earnings. Francis and Philbrick (1993), and Lim (2001) show that analysts act 
sluggishly when revising their estimates downwards for poorly performing firms, leading 
to greater positive bias. Recent evidence by Conrad et al. (2005) also suggests that 
analysts are reluctant to downgrade because of conflict of interests due to investment 
banking relationships. They find that recommendations are asymmetrically “sticky” since 
only very large stock price drops seem to break the optimistic view and change analysts’ 
opinions downward. As Chan et al. (1996) argue, analysts may have disincentives to be 
the front runner with the bad news because this might antagonize management. They will 
need to decide whether the news has a permanent or temporary effect on annual earnings. 
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So, some analysts may want to give the benefit of the doubt and wait for additional 
confirmation before revising their estimates. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) and Barber et al. 
(2004) also provide consistent evidence regarding analysts’ failure to quickly downgrade 
firms that are investment banking clients. Since analysts generally underreact to negative 
news, Elliot et al. (1995) provides evidence that analysts’ consensus downward revisions 
are insufficient. The asymmetry in reacting to good versus bad news is also found in 
herding literature. Welch (2000) finds that, among security analysts, herding towards the 
consensus is significantly stronger when recent returns were positive and when the 
consensus is optimistic. This shows that analysts are also reluctant to follow other 
analysts when it comes to downward revisions.  
Analysts’ behaviors are not uniform either; they differ in forecast accuracy and 
the speed at which they react to news. The heterogeneity of analysts’ behaviors suggests 
that some analysts may lag others while revising their forecasts in the face of bad news. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) document that analysts affiliated with an investment bank 
issue 50% more buy recommendations on the IPO firms than do other analysts. While 
experienced analysts have more accurate forecasts and less underreaction to prior 
earnings information (Mikhail et al. (2003)), Dugar and Nathan (1995), and Lin and 
McNichols (1998) show that analysts who follow firms that are also investment banking 
clients of their firms are more optimistic in their earnings forecasts and investment 
recommendations relative to other analysts. Stickel (1992) finds that “All American” 
analysts not only have more accurate earnings forecasts but also supply forecasts more 
often than other analysts. Zhang (2005) demonstrates that some analysts are quicker than 
others in incorporating new information. She reports that about half of the analysts revise 
their forecasts within three trading days after earnings announcements, whereas for the 
other half, it takes more than a month to update their forecasts.  
This paper assumes that analysts’ reluctance to change their forecasts is most 
pronounced for bad news due to their incentive structures described above. Analysts face 
a difficult decision between accuracy and optimism when there is bad news about the 
firm. No such dilemma would bother analysts when there is good news. As documented 
by the literature, the analysts whose brokerage houses have investment banking 
relationships with the firm, or inexperienced, young analysts would be more hesitant to 
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change their forecasts downwards. Therefore, after bad news, we would observe more 
dispersed forecasts since some analysts update their forecasts downward while others 
refrain from revising their forecasts. As a result, sluggish response to bad news may lead 
to dispersion of forecasts.  
Scherbina (2004) examines an alternative way earnings estimates may be 
upwardly biased. She argues that optimistic bias is higher when earnings are more 
uncertain. She proposes an analyst behavior: if you do not have something good to say, 
do not speak at all, which is also consistent with the career concerns explained above. 
Scherbina calculates a positive bias in consensus estimate whenever the number of 
analysts following a firm declines from its value three months ago assuming that the quiet 
analyst’s estimate is one cent lower than the lowest estimate present. In this construction, 
the greater the dispersion the greater the bias. She finds that the positive bias can predict 
future earnings surprises. Therefore, she suggests that at least part of the return 
predictability of dispersion could be due to analysts’ self selection bias. While 
Scherbina’s (2004) explanation may have merit on its own, this paper presents an 
alternative mechanism for the predictive power of dispersion that does not depend on a 
decrease in the number of analysts following a firm. Moreover, this paper does not 
assume dispersion of forecasts as given, but provides a mechanism by which earnings 
forecasts may become more dispersed conditional on negative information. 
Table II presents some results that are consistent with the above predictions. 
Simple portfolio sorts suggest that stocks, which had bad news in the recent past and 
performed poorly, exhibit higher dispersion of forecasts. Portfolios that are poor 
performers based on past return and earnings performance as well as portfolios that have 
high book to market ratios have the highest dispersion of forecasts. The univariate results 
that show that analysts’ forecasts are more dispersed for poorly performing firms is 
consistent with the hypothesis that some analysts are reluctant in responding to bad news 
than others. If some analysts wait for additional confirmation to slowly revise their 
estimates, the lack of response from those analysts together with quick downward 
revision by others would create dispersion of forecasts for firms with recent poor 
performance. Moreover, consistent with the above discussion, good news does not seem  
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Table VI 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Dispersion on Size, B/M, Momentum, and Past 
Forecast Revision. 
Regressions include firm observations from January 1983 until December 2001. For each month, 
Dispersion is regressed on log of size (market capitalization as of the previous month), log of B/M (book 
value of equity divided by market value of equity as of the previous month), Momentum (past six months’ 
return), Rev3 (past three month’s forecast revision). Disp1 is the ratio between the standard deviation and 
the absolute value of the mean forecasts of earnings per share for the current fiscal year end. Disp2 is in 
percentile rank form. t-stats in parentheses are calculated according to robust standard errors. a, b, c shows 
statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
                             Independent Variables  
 Intercept Size B/M Momentum Rev3 R2 
Disp1 0.690a -0.035a 0.081a -0.634a -1.494a 3.47% 
 (11.82) (9.62) (8.74) (5.36) (4.58)  
Disp2 90.12a -3.010a 6.022a -37.120a -62.21a 10.54% 
 (69.41) (36.65) (14.92) (7.62) (8.59)  
       
 Intercept Size B/M Momentum Rev_Up R2 
Disp1 0.731a -0.034a 0.081a -0.608a -0.075a 2.28% 
 (12.35) (9.42) (8.24) (5.70) (12.83)  
Disp2 89.94a -2.844a 5.807a -33.53a -4.029a 9.41% 
 (70.80) (34.77) (15.37) (7.11) (15.40)  
 
 
 
to have similar impact on dispersion as bad news does as Table II shows that best 
performers have lower dispersion of forecasts.  
After the univariate comparisons of dispersion, I run cross-sectional and time-
series regressions of dispersion on certain firm characteristics to examine what increases 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions using 
dispersion as the dependent variable confirm the univariate analysis. For each month, I 
run regressions of dispersion (Disp1) on size, book to market ratio, previous six month’s 
return performance (Momentum), and previous three month’s change in consensus 
earnings forecast (Rev3). Time-series averages of the coefficients from cross-sectional 
regressions are reported on Table VI.  I also use a dummy variable (Rev_Up) taking the 
value of one if the consensus forecast revision is upwards in the last three months. This 
variable simply differentiates between firms that had good news and bad news in the past.  
In order to correct for outliers, following Johnson (2004) I use Disp2 variable, which is 
the monthly percentile rank of the dispersion variable. The regression results show that 
analysts’ forecasts are more dispersed for small firms, high B/M firms, and poorly  
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Table VII 
Cross-sectional Explanations of Change in Dispersion 
 
This table represents the change in dispersion based on past earnings and return performance. The sample 
data are obtained as explained in Table II. On Panel A, each month, stocks are sorted into five groups based 
on one or six month return and earnings performance. Contemporaneous change in the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts is presented for each portfolio. Dispersion is defined as the ratio between the standard 
deviation and the absolute value of the mean forecasts of earnings per share for the current fiscal year end. 
Panel B presents Fama-MacBeth regressions of change in dispersion on contemporaneous return or 
earnings performance. Momentum1 and Momentum6 are the return performance during the previous 1 and 
6 months, respectively. Rev1 and Rev6 are past one and six month’s earnings forecast revision, 
respectively. a, b, c shows statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 
 Change in Dispersion 
 Momentum1 Momentum6 Rev1 Rev6 
Portfolio1 (low) 0.019 0.108 0.021 0.169 
 0.000 0.019 0.002 0.002 
 0.002 -0.014 -0.000 -0.009 
 -0.003 -0.019 -0.001 -0.009 
Portfolio5 (high) -0.006 -0.039 -0.003 -0.988 
 
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Change in Dispersion 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
                           Independent Variables  
Change in 
Dispersion 
Intercept Momentum6 Rev6 Rev_Up R2 
 0.031 -1.176 -0.0817  0.7% 
 (3.65) (7.94) (3.80)   
 0.086 -1.192  -0.093 0.7% 
 (7.54) (7.65)  (7.97)  
 
 
performing firms. The coefficients for return and earnings momentum variables are 
highly significantly negative. The result that poorly performing firms, in terms of return 
and earnings performance, exhibit higher dispersion is  also consistent with the evidence 
provided by Francis and Philbrick (1993), Chan et al. (1996), Lim (2001), and Conrad et 
al. (2005), which suggest that some analysts are reluctant or slow in responding to bad 
news. 
 I further examine whether changes in dispersion of forecasts are associated with 
firms’ recent performance. Every month, I sort stocks into five portfolios in terms of their 
return and earnings performance in the past one or six months. Then, I report changes in 
dispersion during the same time period that firm performance is measured. Table VII 
shows that analysts forecast dispersion increases as firms perform poorly. On the other 
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hand, dispersion decreases to some extent for firms that have better performance. 
Especially for firms which experience increase in consensus earnings estimates, 
dispersion significantly decreases. This finding is consistent with the evidence that 
analysts herd (Graham (1999), Lamont (2002), and Hong et al. (2000)), and herding 
towards the consensus is significantly stronger when the consensus is optimistic (Welch 
(2000)) since herding generally translates into less dispersion. Panel B of Table VII also 
shows the Fama-MacBeth regressions of change in dispersion on return and earnings 
performance. The regression results are consistent with univariate portfolio sorts, and 
suggest that analyst forecast dispersion increases as bad news for the firms comes in. 
Next, I investigate, for each firm, whether dispersion of forecasts are higher after 
bad news. For this purpose, I run time-series regressions of dispersion and standard 
deviation of forecasts on past three month’s forecast revisions for each firm. Recall that 
dispersion of forecasts is calculated as standard deviation of forecasts scaled by mean 
consensus estimate. Therefore, I also use standard deviation of earnings forecasts for 
individual firm time-series regressions since, for a poorly performing firm, a decrease in 
consensus estimate mechanically inflates the dispersion measure. I require at least five 
years of data to be available in order to run time-series regression for a particular firm. 
Mean and median coefficients across all the stocks used in the regressions are provided 
on Table VIII. A downward consensus forecast revision suggests that there is some bad 
news about the firm. If some analysts update their forecasts downwards and some are 
reluctant or wait for more confirmation, we would observe higher dispersion for firms 
with recent bad news. Time-series regressions on Table VIII demonstrate that all of the 
coefficients of the variables measuring past three month’s consensus forecast revision are 
significantly negative. Median of the individual coefficients is smaller than mean of the 
coefficients suggesting some skewness. Nevertheless, all of the coefficients reported on 
Table VIII are highly significant. So, when there is bad news about a particular firm, the 
reluctance of some analysts to quickly update their forecasts downwards results in a 
higher dispersion of forecasts. Since the reluctance for downward revisions also leads to 
insufficient change in the consensus estimate, it might have implications for price 
discovery process especially for poorly performing firms. This issue is going to be 
examined in the next section. 
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Table VIII 
Time-Series Regressions of Dispersion and Standard Deviation of Analyst Forecasts 
on Past Forecast Revision. 
Regressions include firm observations from January 1983 until December 2001. For each firm, Dispersion 
and StdDev (standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts) is regressed on Rev3 (past three month’s 
forecast revision), and Rev_Up (dummy variable taking the value of 1 if forecast revision is upward, 0 
otherwise). Disp1 is the ratio between the standard deviation and the absolute value of the mean forecasts 
of earnings per share for the current fiscal year end. Time-series regressions are run on individual stocks 
with at least five years of data. Mean and median regression coefficients are calculated on the cross-section 
of firms. t-stats in parentheses are calculated for mean coefficients according to robust standard errors. p-
values for the median coefficients are presented in parentheses. a, b, c shows statistical significance at the 
one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively 
 
 Dependent 
Variable 
          Independent Variables   
Mean  Intercept Rev3 Rev_Up R2  
 Disp1 0.176a -2.220a  6.79%  
  (21.61) (9.90)    
  0.218a  -0.077a 3.04%  
  (25.28)  (9.01)   
 StdDev 0.129a -0.256a  5.5%  
  (31.96) (4.79)    
  0.178a  -0.008a 3.72%  
  (5.51)  (2.46)   
Median       
 Disp1 0.072a -0.611a  2.92%  
  (0.000) (0.000)    
  0.087a  -0.016a 1.87%  
  (0.000)  (0.000)   
 StdDev 0.088a -0.087a  2.47%  
  (0.000) (0.000)    
  0.090a  -0.003a 1.67%  
  (0.000)  (0.000)   
 
F. Dispersion of Forecasts and Stock Returns 
Even if we accept that analyst forecasts are more dispersed and consensus forecast 
revisions are incomplete after negative event news, it would not have a significant impact 
on asset prices if investors can recognize and correct for this biased behavior when 
pricing assets. However, current literature suggests otherwise. Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis (2003a) examine analyst firm specific experience and its relation to post earnings 
announcement drift. Because experienced analysts have more accurate forecasts, they 
find that post earnings announcement drift is smaller for firms that are followed by more 
experienced analysts. Similarly, Zhang (2005) examines analysts’ responsiveness to new 
information and its relation to post earnings announcement drift. She finds that post-
earnings announcement drift is significantly lower when the percentage of responsive 
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analysts following the firm is higher. Therefore forecast accuracy and the speed at which 
analysts incorporate new information into their forecasts seems to be associated with the 
market underreaction to earnings announcements. These results suggest that analysts’ 
earnings estimates are an important part of the information set that is reflected in stock 
prices.  
It also seems that investors naively rely on analysts’ optimistic growth forecasts 
as described by Dechow et al. (2000). The authors demonstrate that controlling for 
optimistic growth forecasts, post equity issue underperformance disappears. Moreover, 
Dechow and Sloan (1997) also find that investors’ naïve reliance on analysts’ optimistic 
forecasts of earnings growth can explain half of the profits to contrarian investment 
strategies (using fundamental to price ratios). They suggest that because investors do not 
fully correct for biases, analysts’ biased growth forecasts are reflected in stock prices. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) show that long run performance of firms recommended by 
underwriter analysts are significantly worse than those of firms recommended by other 
analysts. Therefore, they suggest that investors do not fully correct for the optimistic bias 
of underwriter analysts. Lastly, after finding significant price drift especially for firms 
with poor past earnings performance, Chan et al. (1996) suggest that because analysts are 
slow in revising their estimates downward, the inertia in revising forecasts may prevent 
the market to incorporate new information in a timely fashion.  
Reluctant response of some analysts to negative news leads to not only more 
dispersed forecasts, but also insufficient revision of the consensus estimate. Within this 
framework, the above findings can be explained in a boundedly rational world where an 
investor follows a particular analyst or the consensus. In this case, high dispersion stocks 
among poorly performing firms would underperform. However, it would not be the case 
for better performing firms. To illustrate this point, first, I present two-dimensional, 
independent sorts using size, B/M, six month momentum, and consensus forecast revision 
as additional sorting variables. Mean portfolio returns for two dimensional sorts are 
reported on Table IX.  The results I find are also consistent with those of Diether et al. 
(2002). I observe a strong size, B/M, and momentum (return and earnings) effect in Table 
IX. The return differential between low and high dispersion stocks is highly significant 
for the smaller stocks, stocks with high B/M, and stocks with negative  
Table IX 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Size, B/M, Momentum, Rev6 and Dispersion in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
This table represents average monthly returns of dispersion portfolios conditioning on Size, B/M, Momentum, and Consensus Forecast Revision. The period 
covered is January 1983 to December 2001. Each month, stocks are sorted into five groups by size (S), B/M, momentum (M), and past six month’s forecast 
revision (Rev6), then sorted into five additional groups based on the level of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for the previous month. Momentum is 
calculated as the past returns from month t-7 to t-2. Stocks with a mean forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion portfolio. t-statistics are calculated 
according to robust standard errors. a, b, c shows statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Mean Returns   Mean Returns 
 Size Quintiles   B/M Quintiles 
Dispersion S1 
(Small) 
S2 S3 S4 S5 (Large)   B/M1 
(Low) 
B/M2 B/M3 B/M4 B/M5 
(High) 
D1 (low) 1.54 1.52 1.55 1.47 1.46   1.31 1.34 1.42 1.66 1.92 
D2 1.42 1.50 1.48 1.26 1.28   1.30 1.21 1.33 1.57 1.71 
D3 1.08 1.24 1.37 1.14 1.40   1.23 1.25 1.07 1.49 1.47 
D4 0.73 1.17 1.34 1.45 1.32   1.47 1.04 0.97 1.28 1.29 
D5 (high) 0.32 0.74 0.93 1.08 1.42   0.97 0.55 0.64 0.81 0.76 
Low-High 1.22a 0.79a 0.62b 0.38 0.05   0.34 0.79a 0.77a 0.85a 1.15a 
t-stat. 5.44 2.95 2.17 1.36 0.66   0.90 2.7 3.05 3.65 4.70 
             
  Mean Returns     Mean Returns   
 Momentum Quintiles   Forecast Revision Quintiles 
Dispersion M1 
(Losers) 
M2 M3 M4 M5 
(Winners) 
  Rev6 
(Losers) 
Rev6 Rev6 Rev6 Rev6 
(Winners) 
D1 (low) 1.05 1.59 1.57 1.39 1.83   1.38 1.30 1.38 1.47 1.91 
D2 0.76 1.53 1.46 1.31 1.67   1.27 1.12 1.18 1.40 1.71 
D3 0.66 1.23 1.32 1.33 1.95   1.06 0.95 1.16 1.39 1.65 
D4 0.38 1.26 1.28 1.14 1.97   0.69 0.98 1.00 1.29 1.65 
D5 (high) 0.04 0.99 0.93 0.81 1.59   0.31 0.64 1.06 1.11 1.48 
Low-High 1.01a 0.60b 0.64b 0.58c 0.24   1.07a 0.66b 0.32 0.36 0.43 
t-stat 3.92 2.09 1.97 1.68 0.94   3.49 1.99 0.83 1.02 1.46 
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momentum. A zero investment strategy for the smallest quintile earns a significant 1.22% 
per month while the biggest quintile earns 0.05% per month, which is not significant. 
Results regarding firm size are consistent with Brown (1997) who finds that analysts’ 
biases are significantly smaller for large firms. The same strategy earns a significant 
1.15% per month for the highest B/M portfolio while there are no significant returns for 
the lowest B/M portfolio. The same pattern can bee seen for momentum portfolios, 
negative momentum stocks exhibiting greater differential between low and high 
dispersion stocks.  
Portfolio sorts based on past six month’s change in consensus estimates provide 
insightful results for the argument set forth in the previous sections.  Some analysts’ 
reluctance to revise their estimate downwards results in more dispersed forecasts as well 
as incomplete change in consensus forecasts.  Underreaction of the consensus estimate to 
negative news leads to continuation of low returns. Therefore, even though there might 
be various reasons why analysts’ forecasts may be dispersed, we would expect to observe 
more pronounced lower subsequent returns for high dispersion stocks if the dispersion is 
created due to slow response to bad news. Otherwise, high dispersion stocks should not 
significantly underperform low dispersion stocks. Table IX shows that a zero investment 
strategy for the loser portfolio earns 1.07% per month while winner portfolio earns an 
insignificant 0.43%. So, lower subsequent returns of high dispersion stocks are, in some 
part, due to poorly performing firms for which some analysts’ reluctant response to 
negative news creates dispersion of forecasts and insufficient reaction to bad news. 
Furthermore, I use Fama-MacBeth regressions to test the hypothesis that the 
negative relationship between dispersion and subsequent returns should be more 
pronounced for poorly performing firms. For this purpose, I run cross-sectional 
regressions of stock returns on size, B/M, past six month’s return as the return 
momentum, dispersion in percentile rank form (Disp2), and a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the average forecast revision in the past six months is negative or zero 
otherwise (Rev_D). Empirically, we should observe the interaction variable between 
Rev_D and Disp2 to be significantly negative to support the idea that dispersion predicts 
lower returns especially for poorly performing firms. Table X shows that the interaction  
Table X 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Return on Size, B/M, Momentum, Dispersion, Past Six Month’s Forecast Revision, and Their 
Product. 
The period covered is January 1983 to December 2001. Dispersion is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation and the absolute value of the mean 
forecasts of earnings per share for the current fiscal year end. Disp2 is dispersion of forecasts in percentile form. Momentum is calculated as the past returns from 
month t-7 to t-2. Rev6 is calculated as the average change in consensus forecast in the past six months. Rev_D is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
average revision in the past six months is negative or 0 otherwise. In each month, return is regressed on Size, B/M, Momentum, Disp2, Rev_D, and the 
interaction variable between Disp2 and Rev_D. Time-series averages of the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions are reported. t-statistics are calculated 
according to robust standard errors. a, b, c shows statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent Variables  
Return Intercept Size B/M Momentum Disp2 Rev_D Interaction R2 
 1.672c 0.005 0.351b 0.091a -0.009a   4.4% 
 (1.88) (0.08) (2.37) (5.21) (2.98)    
 1.684c -0.011 0.340b 0.086a -0.008a -0.314a  4.55% 
 (1.85) (0.18) (2.12) (4.95) (2.87) (3.54)   
 1.773c -0.009 0.341b 0.085a -0.010b -0.198a -0.004b 4.62% 
 (1.92) (-0.16) (2.13) (5.06) (2.27) (3.14) (2.44)  
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variable is -0.004 and significant at the five percent level. This shows that high dispersion 
stocks earn even lower returns if the firm has negative earnings performance in the recent 
past. In sum, the empirical results in this paper demonstrate that high dispersion stocks 
seem to predict low returns. However, this predictability is more pronounced for firms 
with recent negative performance. The reason for this conditional predictability stems 
from the argument that some analysts’ reluctance to revise their forecasts downward 
leads to dispersion of forecasts and market underreaction to bad news. In this argument, I 
don’t consider the dynamics between optimist and pessimist investors in the market to 
explain the dispersion effect. Analysts’ insufficient reaction to bad news leads to market 
underreaction, and therefore low returns for poorly performing firms. Dispersion is 
merely a byproduct of this behavior. 
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CHAPTER III 
SHORT SALES AND STOCK RETURNS 
 
A. Introduction 
Short interest (shares sold short / total shares outstanding) predicts future returns. 
The literature seems to offer two different explanations for this predictability. Since a 
typical short seller is considered to be a sophisticated investor, short sellers might have 
some informational advantage (acquisition or processing) over an average investor. 
Therefore, short interest level might predict low future returns due to its information 
content. Dechow et al. (2001) show that short sellers use information in fundamental-to-
price ratios to take positions in stocks with lower expected future returns, and unwind 
their positions as these ratios mean-revert. Desai et al. (2002) demonstrate that short 
interest level is a bearish signal. They assert that the negative relationship between short 
interest and subsequent stock returns is due to short sellers being informed investors. 
Desai et al. (2002) also show that the higher the short interest the greater its 
informativeness. 
Another strand of literature approaches to the same issue in terms of short selling 
costs. When shorting costs are substantial, market forces will be unable to prevent an 
overpricing in the amount of shorting costs. In this case, today’s overpricing therefore the 
price correction in the future would be directly proportional to the shorting costs. The 
greater the shorting costs, the greater the possible overpricing; and therefore, the lower 
the subsequent stock returns. Particularly, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) (APR 
hereafter) argue that stocks with high short interest and low institutional ownership have 
high short selling constraints/costs and that based on Miller (1977) argument, they 
underperform because today’s temporary overpricing gets corrected in the future. In this 
argument, there is no informational role of short interest for future returns, but rather 
short interest as a proxy for the higher cost of shorting is the primary reason of lower 
future returns.  
This paper argues that the empirical evidence provided by APR may also be 
consistent with an information argument. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) propose that 
high cost of shorting could function as a filter, which drives out uninformed trades from 
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the pool of short sales. Therefore, the resulting observed short interest will reflect 
relatively more informed trades when shorting costs are significant. As a result, short 
interest might be more informative about future stock returns when shorting is costly. 
 APR assume that short interest is a proxy for short sale demand, and institutional 
ownership is a proxy for supply. They contend that when there is high demand and low 
supply, short sale constraints are binding. Therefore, stocks with high short interest and 
low institutional ownership would earn significantly lower future returns. The argument 
set forth by APR has some merit. Stocks can be overpriced when short sale constraints 
bind. And we would observe underperformance when prices revert to their equilibrium 
levels in the future. D’Avolio (2002) find that short sale costs decrease with size and 
institutional ownership, and that loan fees increase with short interest level as the stocks 
with the highest short interest level have loan fees about 1.8% per year. Examining costs 
of shorting directly, Jones and Lamont (2002) find that stocks that are expensive to short 
have low subsequent returns, but they underperform by more than the costs of shorting. 
Moreover, relating short interest level to short sale costs has a fundamental conceptual 
flaw. As Cochrane (2005) points out unmet demand for shorting should be correlated 
with lower subsequent returns. A large met demand only means that short sellers were 
able to express their opinions. This paper argues that documented short sale costs 
associated with high short interest stocks are too small to explain the predictive ability of 
short interest for future returns. And, using future earnings news, we empirically 
demonstrate that short interest is informative regarding the future firm performance 
especially when institutional ownership is low.  
I first confirm the predictive ability of short interest. Each month, I sort stocks 
into ten portfolios based on their short interest level, and compare one-month ahead 
returns across ten groups. From January 1988 to December 2002, highest shorted stocks 
underperform lowest shorted stocks by 1.6% per month and 1.62% per month after 
adjusting for four factors (market, size, book to market, momentum). I also find that 
among stocks with the highest short interest, those with lower institutional ownership 
underperform the most. I rank stocks in the top short interest decile into three groups 
based on institutional ownership. Consistent with APR results, I find that the 
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underperformance of stocks with lower institutional ownership is -0.93% per month on a 
risk adjusted basis while it is -0.21% for stocks with higher institutional ownership. 
In order to test whether this predictability is a mere consequence of short selling 
costs or whether informativeness of short sales varies with institutional ownership, I 
conduct an experiment to see whether short interest can also predict earnings 
announcement surprises. If the return predictability is due to overpricing caused by short 
selling costs, short interest should have no relation with future earning surprises. On the 
other hand, if short sellers are better able to acquire or process firm specific information 
and institutional ownership as a proxy for shorting costs increases the informativeness of 
short interest, short interest level would be negatively related with earning surprises 
especially when institutional ownership is low. I find that short interest level predicts 
earning surprises. Specifically, the ability of short interest to predict earnings surprises is 
greater for stocks with lower institutional ownership (i.e stocks with higher shorting 
costs). Stocks with lower institutional ownership experience more negative earning 
surprises that stocks with higher institutional ownership. These findings are consistent 
with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) argument and shed some light on the observation 
that why stocks with high short interest and low institutional ownership earn lower 
subsequent returns.  
For a robustness check, I examine return and earnings announcement 
predictability of short interest level using a sample of stocks that are unlikely to be short 
sale constrained. D’Avolio (2002) reports that the vast majority of hard to borrow stocks 
are in the bottom size decile or are under $5. So, I conduct the tests based on this sub-
sample and find that short interest level still predicts lower subsequent returns and future 
earning surprises although predictive power is lower. 
The findings in this paper suggest that the return predictability of short interest 
may not be entirely due to Miller (1977) argument. The results are consistent with the 
idea that the level of short interest is informative regarding future firm performance 
especially for stocks with low institutional ownership. Therefore, the results in this paper 
are in line with those that find short sellers are informed. Christophe et al. (2004) find 
that, among 913 Nasdaq-listed firms, short sellers increase their positions five days 
before earnings announcements for stocks with negative earnings performance. Desai et 
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al. (2006) find that short sellers accumulate positions prior to earnings restatement 
announcements and later cover their positions. Francis et al. (2006) show that analysts 
use the information in short interest since analysts downgrade their earnings forecasts 
more severely for firms with high unexpected short interest. Boehmer et al. (2006) find 
that short sellers’ trades are informative regarding future returns. And finally, Cohen et 
al. (2005) show that an increase in shorting demand predicts negative abnormal returns in 
the subsequent month. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section B, I formalize the 
hypotheses regarding stock return predictability based on short sale constraint and 
information stories. Section C provides the data and methodologies used in the paper. I 
present the results in section D that show that short interest predicts not only future 
returns but also future earnings surprises. 
 
B. Hypotheses 
APR find that stocks with high short interest and low institutional ownership earn 
abnormally low returns in the future. They interpret their empirical results to be 
consistent with Miller (1977). That is, since they assume that high short interest and low 
institutional ownership stocks are short sale constrained, currently those stocks would be 
overpriced resulting in lower future returns. The predictability of future returns is directly 
proportional to the magnitude of market frictions or short sale costs rather than the 
information content of short interest. In this section, I argue that the observed empirical 
findings are more consistent with the idea that short sellers exploit their informational 
advantage and that they are better able to do so when institutional ownership is low. 
 
B.1 Changes in Short Sale Constraints and Contemporaneous Returns 
Miller (1977) argument is based on the premise that short sale constraints may 
cause overpricing since the marginal investor would be an optimist because of short sale 
restrictions. A natural consequence of this argument is that the higher the constraints, the 
higher the overpricing.1 Therefore, for a particular firm, if short sale constraints become 
                                                 
1 Duffie et al. (2002) also explain a case where investors might be willing to pay higher than the stocks fair 
value due to the expectation to receive lending fees. However, this effect should be more pronounced for 
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more severe, stocks would become more overpriced, hence a positive relationship 
between changes in short sale constraints and contemporaneous stock returns. Boehme et 
al. (2005) reports some results consistent with this idea. Since APR uses short interest 
and institutional ownership jointly to proxy for short sale constraints, an increase in short 
interest and/or a decrease in institutional ownership should be positively correlated with 
contemporaneous returns. On the other hand, information story of short interest has no 
predictions regarding changes in institutional ownership, but has the same predictions 
with changes in short interest. Short sellers might increase their positions in stocks, which 
they think is getting more overpriced and have lower expected future returns. Consistent 
with this argument, Brent et al. (1990) find that investors tend to increase their short 
interest positions when the stock price increases. Also, Dechow et al. (2001) find that 
short sellers position themselves as prices go up and unwind their short positions as 
prices mean-revert. Here are the predictions of both arguments. 
 
   ρ(rt,t+1, ∆short interestt,t+1) ρ(rt,t+1, ∆institutional ownershipt,t+1)  
Miller (1977)   +    -     
Information    +    ? 
 
We test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The contemporaneous stock returns are positively correlated with changes 
in short interest and negatively correlated with changes in institutional ownership.   
 
B.2. Short Interest and Future Earnings Surprises 
According to Miller (1977), predictability of future returns is a result of short sale 
constraints: the higher the constraints, the greater the overpricing today, therefore the 
lower the future returns. In this argument, return predictability is not related with future 
firm (operating) performance. APR find that stocks with high short interest and low 
institutional ownership earn lower future returns. Assuming high short interest and low 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms with high institutional ownership because lenders who own the stock in street name do not receive the 
lending fee.  
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institutional ownership as a proxy for short sale constraints, APR interpret this finding to 
be consistent with Miller (1977). Nevertheless, this measure of short sale constraints 
should predict future returns but not future company events (good news or bad news). For 
example, using a direct cost of shorting, Reed (2003) finds no relationship between 
earnings announcements and rebate rates.  
On the other hand, information story has some predictions regarding firms’ future 
(operating) performance. As supported by Desai et al. (2002), Christophe et al. (2004), 
Desai et al. (2006), Boehmer et al. (2006), and Francis et al. (2006) short sellers are 
informed regarding the future fundamental value of firms. Therefore, short interest would 
be a good predictor of future firm performance as well as stock returns. Moreover, 
Boehmer and Kelley (2006) find that stocks with higher institutional ownership are 
priced more efficiently. Institutions seem to enhance the informational environment that 
helps to price stocks, therefore reducing the profitable opportunities for short sellers. 
Therefore, short sellers would be better able to exploit their informational advantage 
when institutional ownership is low. Moreover, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) point 
out that short sales might be more informative when costs of shorting are high. As a 
result, information story of short interest posits that short interest predicts future value 
relevant firm news, and therefore future returns, and that this predictability is stronger 
when institutional ownership is low. This paper uses future earnings announcements as 
value relevant company news to determine whether short sellers are informed. Here are 
predictions of both arguments: 
 
  ρ(high short and low institutional ownership, future earnings surprises) 
    
Miller (1977)    0 
Information    –   
 
I test the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Stocks with high short interest is not related with future earnings 
surprises. 
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Hypothesis 2b: Institutional ownership does not affect the relationship between short 
interest and future earnings surprises. 
 
C. Data and Methodology 
Data on stock returns are from CRSP for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks 
with share code 10 or 11 between January 1988 and December 2002. Short interest, 
Short, is defined as total shares sold short divided by shares outstanding. Data on 
institutional ownership are obtained from 13F filings. Total amount of institutional 
holdings are calculated by summing the holdings of all institutions for each stock in each 
quarter. Stocks that have available return data but no reported institutional holdings are 
assumed to have zero institutional ownership. The variable, instown, is defined as total 
institutional ownership divided by common shares outstanding obtained from CRSP. 
Since institutional ownership data is available only quarterly, I assume institutional 
ownership remains the same for all months in the quarter.  
Book values, wherever needed, are taken from COMPUSTAT annual files. Size is 
the market value of equity calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the 
month-end share price. Book value is calculated as book value of equity plus deferred 
taxes. B/M is book value divided by market value of equity where book value of equity is 
from the most recent fiscal year-end that is preceding calculation date of market value by 
at least 3 months. I exclude firms with negative book values. MOM is the total return 
performance of a firm in the last 12 months.  
Quarterly earnings and announcement dates are obtained from COMPUSTAT 
quarterly files. I use two measures of earnings news. First is the standardized unexpected 
earnings (SUE) variable. Following Foster et al. (1984), I use the following model of 
expected earnings. The SUE in month t is defined as 
 
   
t
tt EPSEEPSSUE σ
][−=    (2) 
where EPSt is the quarterly earnings per share most recently announced, E[EPSt] is 
expected earnings per share, and σt is the standard deviation of unexpected earnings 
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(EPSt – E[EPSt]) over the preceding eight quarters. I use two models to estimate expected 
earnings. First is a seasonal AR(1), second is a seasonal random walk model. Since these 
two measures provide very similar results, we report the results for the second and the 
simpler model. 
 
)(][ 514 −−− −++= tttt EPSEPSEPSEPSE βα  (3) 
4][ −+= tt EPSEPSE α    (4) 
 
Following Chan et al. (1996), second measure of earnings news is the average daily 
abnormal stock returns around the earnings announcement date (ABR), defined as 
 
∑=
−=
−=
1
2
)(
4
1 j
j
mjiji rrABR    (5) 
 
where rij is the stock i’s return on day j and rmj is the return on the equally-weighted 
CRSP market index. Day 0 is the earnings announcement date. This measure of earnings 
news is free of a model for earnings expectations since it captures the market’s surprise 
when the earnings are announced. 
I use a standard portfolio approach to test the predictive ability of short interest 
for future returns. Each month, I rank stocks on the basis of short interest. The ranked 
stocks are then assigned to one of ten decile portfolios. Then, I compute average returns 
for each portfolio in the following month after portfolio formation. All stocks are equally 
weighted in a portfolio. Time-series means of portfolio returns are presented in Table XI. 
Portfolio abnormal returns are calculated from a four-factor model 
 
pttttftmtftpt MOMHMLSMBrrrr εββββα ++++−+=− 4321 )(  (6) 
 
where rpt – rft is the portfolio return minus the return on one-month T-bill, rmt – rft is the 
market excess return, SMB is the size factor return, HML is the B/M factor return, and 
MOM is the momentum factor return. Factor returns are taken from Kenneth French’s  
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Table XI 
Mean Portfolio Returns Based on Short Interest 
This table shows the short interest, institutional ownership, size and mean returns of portfolios sorted on 
short interest.  
The sample contains NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks during the period from January 1988 to December 
2002. Short is short interest divided by shares outstanding. Instown is the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions as reported in 13F filings. Size is the market value of equity and defined as share price times the 
number of shares outstanding. BM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity 
calculated at least three months before the short interest data. α is the intercept from a four-factor model 
including mktrf, smb, hml, and umd. Each month stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based on Short. P1 is 
the portfolio with the lowest short interest. Time-series means of firm characteristics as well as raw and 
abnormal monthly returns for each portfolio are presented. T-stats are calculated according to robust 
standard errors. 
 
 Short Instown Size BM Raw ret. α t-value 
P1 (low) 0.002 12.27 68.83 1.09 1.75 1.17 4.21 
 0.014 15.84 128.36 0.98 1.49 0.92 2.94 
 0.046 18.91 192.01 0.93 1.54 0.88 3.52 
 0.112 22.88 432.58 0.88 1.51 0.81 3.51 
 0.238 27.95 1,465.25 0.81 1.22 0.56 2.36 
 0.434 33.24 2,990.54 0.73 1.14 0.42 2.16 
 0.739 37.86 3,088.06 0.69 0.91 0.14 1.10 
 1.251 41.12 2,469.46 0.66 0.84 0.08 0.70 
 2.335 41.53 1,770.05 0.71 0.48 -0.16 -1.22 
P10 (high) 7.642 43.14 1,006.96 0.74 0.15 -0.45 -2.47 
P1 – P10     1.60 -1.62 -6.28 
 
 
web site. The intercepts from a time-series regression of the four-factor model, α, for 
each portfolio sorted on short interest are presented in Table XI. 
 
D. Results 
This section provides some empirical results where I test aforementioned 
hypotheses and try to determine whether predictability of stock returns by short interest is 
more consistent with a short sale constraints argument or with an information argument. I 
first replicate APR’s results and report in Table XI that stocks with high short interest 
underperform those with low short interest by 1.60% per month, and 1.62% by a risk 
adjusted basis. The stocks in the tenth decile portfolio, on the average, have 7.6% of short 
interest, and these stocks’ monthly average risk adjusted returns are -0.45% and highly 
statistically significant with a t-value of -2.47. 
The above results are consistent with both of the arguments. What APR suggest is 
that the predictability not only comes due to the level of short interest but, in fact, due to  
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Table XII 
Mean Portfolio Returns Based on Constraint 
This table shows the short interest, institutional ownership, constraint and mean returns of portfolios sorted 
on constraint.  
The sample is constructed similarly as in Table I. Data frequency is quarterly. Constraint is defined as the 
Instown minus Short. Panel A reports mean monthly returns of the subsequent three months for portfolios 
sorted on Short. In Panel B, each quarter stocks are sorted into portfolios based on Constraint. Mean 
monthly returns of the subsequent three months for each portfolio are calculated. Time-series means are 
reported. 
 
Panel A 
 Short Raw Ret. 
P1 0.001 1.69 
 0.013 1.55 
 0.045 1.46 
 0.114 1.45 
 0.244 1.20 
 0.448 1.04 
 0.762 0.92 
 1.285 0.80 
 2.398 0.55 
P10 7.815 0.04 
P1 – P10  1.65 
 
Panel B 
 Constraint Instown Short Raw Ret. 
P1 73.80 75.87 2.06 1.06 
 58.08 59.98 1.89 1.04 
 46.84 48.57 1.73 1.10 
 36.78 38.26 1.47 1.03 
 27.97 29.25 1.28 0.96 
 20.13 21.21 1.08 0.92 
 13.35 14.27 0.92 1.03 
 7.57 8.32 0.75 1.32 
 2.99 3.59 0.60 1.16 
P10 -0.19 1.13 1.31 1.08 
P1 – P10    0.02 
 
the stocks with high short interest and low institutional ownership. APR assert that stocks 
with high short interest and low institutional ownership are shot sale constrained and that 
“only stocks with binding short sale constraints should have negative future abnormal 
returns”. To follow this line of argument, I define a variable, constraint, as institutional 
ownership minus short interest. According to APR, stocks with the lowest value of the 
variable constraint are the ones with the highest short sale constraints. Table XII reports 
that the most constrained stocks have a value of -0.19 for the constraint variable. This 
means that for these stocks, short interest is actually higher than institutional ownership. 
If the return predictability is truly due to the binding short selling constraints as APR  
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Table XIII 
Change in Institutional Ownership, Short Interest, and Contemporaneous Returns 
This table reports the contemporaneous returns of portfolios sorted on change in institutional ownership 
(Panel A) and change in short interest (Panel B).  
The sample contains NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks during the period from January 1988 to December 
2002. ∆Instown is the change in institutional ownership from quarter t to t+1. ∆Short  is the change in short 
interest ratio from quarter t to t+1. In Panel A, each quarter t, stocks are first sorted into five portfolios 
based on Short, then sorted into five additional portfolios based on ∆Instown. Mean quarterly returns are 
calculated contemporaneously with ∆Instown. Time-series means are reported. For Panel B, each quarter t, 
stocks are first sorted into five portfolios based on Short, then sorted into five additional portfolios based on 
∆Short. Mean quarterly returns are calculated contemporaneously with ∆Short. Time-series means are 
reported. 
 
Panel A 
  Short Interest Quantiles  
 Short 1    Short 5 
∆Instown 1 0.99 0.39 -0.71 -1.41 -3.35 
 1.17 0.80 0.30 -0.04 -1.04 
 1.51 0.74 0.77 0.43 0.10 
 1.98 1.81 1.73 1.71 1.59 
∆Instown 5 3.07 3.79 3.66 3.92 4.49 
 
 
 
Panel B 
  Short Interest Quantiles  
 Short 1    Short 5 
∆Short 1 -0.05 -0.14 -0.21 -0.34 -0.51 
 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.36 -0.18 
 1.19 0.95 0.88 0.77 0.28 
 2.41 2.24 1.79 1.71 1.06 
∆Short 5 4.95 4.23 2.99 2.09 1.15 
 
argue, we should observe a clear predictability of future returns based on the variable, 
constraint. However, as Table XII Panel B demonstrates, there is no evidence that stocks, 
which are highly short sale constrained, underperform others since the hedge portfolio 
earns an insignificant 0.02% per month. Therefore, the results in Table XII cast some 
doubt on the arguments of APR. 
Next, I turn to testing Hypothesis 1. APR argues that, consistent with Miller 
(1977), stocks with binding short sale constraints (high short interest and low institutional 
ownership) are overpriced today and therefore should have negative subsequent abnormal 
returns. So, the basic premise of Miller (1977) argument is that when short sale 
constraints become more binding, overpricing increases, and vice versa. Therefore, we 
should observe a positive relationship between changes in short sale constraints and 
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changes in prices. Since APR use short interest and institutional ownership to determine 
short sale constraints, I conduct tests on both of the variables. 
Each quarter, I first rank stocks into five portfolios based on short interest, then I 
rank each of these portfolios into additional five portfolios based on changes in 
institutional ownership or short interest, and I report contemporaneous mean quarterly 
returns for each portfolio. An increase in institutional ownership means increasing the 
supply of loanable stocks therefore relaxing short selling constraints. According to APR, 
we should observe lower contemporaneous returns for those stocks. However, Table XIII 
Panel A demonstrates that, in fact, increase in institutional ownership is associated with 
higher contemporaneous returns. For example, among the highest short interest stocks, 
the stocks with lowest change in institutional ownership earn -3.35% while stocks with 
the highest change in institutional ownership earn 4.49% during the quarter where 
changes in institutional ownership are measured. Therefore, this result is not consistent 
with APR’s application of Miller (1977) argument to short interest level. In a similar 
study, Cohen et al. (2005), considering a decrease in shorting supply as tightening of 
short sale constraints, find that a decrease in shorting supply does not have a significant 
predictability for subsequent returns. 
I also examine contemporaneous returns relative to changes in short interest. 
According to APR, an increase in short interest increases the short selling constraints, 
therefore, should increase prices and exacerbate overpricing. Table XIII Panel B shows 
that contemporaneous returns are indeed positively correlated with changes in short 
interest: prices and short interest increase (decrease) together. However, there is an 
alternative explanation for this finding. Dechow et al. (2001) report that short sellers 
position themselves in stocks with lower expected future returns and reduce their 
positions as prices come down. The two arguments have the same predictions but differ 
in terms of the direction of causality. APR argue that the change in short selling 
constraints drives the prices, whereas Information story argues that the change in prices 
drives the change in short interest. Since I don’t make causal conclusions, the test using 
changes in short interest is inconclusive in regards to differentiating between Miller 
(1977) and Information argument. 
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Next, I examine short interest in terms of its predictive power regarding future 
company (good or bad) news. I use future earnings announcements to proxy for value 
relevant news events. As discussed in Hypothesis 2, if the return predictability of short 
interest is due to information advantage of short sellers about fundamental value of firms, 
short interest should also predict future earnings surprises as well as future returns. In 
fact, the return predictability is a product of short sellers’ ability to identify firms that 
they expect to do poorly in the future. However, if the return predictability is merely due 
to market frictions/short selling constraints as APR suggests, short interest should have 
no predictive power regarding future earnings announcements.  
Table XIV Panel A reports some descriptive statistics about earnings surprises 
between 1988 and 2002. When stocks are sorted into five portfolios based on 
standardized unexpected earnings, SUE, I see that the stocks with the most positive 
(negative) earnings surprises earn 0.48% (-0.48%) abnormal return per day around 
announcement days [-2,1].  Table XIV Panel B replicates the results in Table 5 in APR. 
Each month, stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based on short interest, and the portfolio 
with the highest short interest is then sorted into additional three portfolios based on 
institutional ownership. One month ahead raw returns and four-factor model adjusted 
abnormal returns are reported. Similar to the findings of APR, among stocks with high 
short interest, the lower the institutional ownership, the more negative are the portfolio’s 
abnormal returns. Institutional ownership affects the predictive power of short interest. At 
first sight these results seem consistent with Miller (1977) argument as APR interprets 
since the stocks with the highest short sale constraints (high short interest and low 
institutional ownership) earn the lowest subsequent returns. But on closer inspection, the 
fact that this varying predictive power also applies to future earnings surprises makes the 
results more consistent with an information argument. As the results for SUE and 
announcement abnormal returns suggest, short sellers are better able to predict future 
earning surprises when institutional ownership is low. For example, while stocks with the 
highest institutional ownership experience 0.03% return during the first future earnings 
announcement, stocks with the lowest institutional ownership experience -0.24%. The 
difference between the two groups is statistically and economically significant. This 
result is consistent with information argument as explained in Section B.2. As Panel B  
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Table XIV 
Short Interest and Earnings Announcements Surprises 
This table demonstrates the relationship between short interest and future earnings announcement surprises. 
SUE, standardized unexpected earnings is unexpected earnings (the change in quarterly earnings per share 
from quarter t-4 to quarter t) divided by the standard deviation of unexpected earnings over the last eight 
quarters. ABR is the mean daily abnormal return around earnings announcement date, [-2,+1] where t=0 is 
the announcement date. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Each quarter, stocks are sorted into five 
portfolios based on SUE, and time-series means of SUE and announcement abnormal returns are reported. 
In Panel B, stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based on Short. The portfolio with highest Short is then 
sorted into three additional portfolios based on Instown. Time-series means of raw returns, four factor 
adjusted abnormal returns, SUE, and mean daily earnings announcement abnormal returns are reported. 
Panel C reports standardized unexpected earnings. Each quarter, stocks are first sorted into five portfolios 
based on Instown, then sorted into five additional portfolios based on Short. SUE for the closest future 
earnings announcement is calculated and time-series means for each portfolio is reported. Panel D reports 
mean daily abnormal returns around earnings announcement date, [-2,+1] where t=0 is the announcement 
date. Each quarter, stocks are first sorted into five portfolios based on Instown, then sorted into five 
additional portfolios based on Short. Abnormal returns for the closest future earnings announcement is 
calculated, and time-series means for each portfolio is reported. 
 
Panel A 
 SUE 1    SUE 5 
SUE -2.49 -0.31 0.15 0.74 2.66 
ABR -0.48 -0.22 0.17 0.39 0.48 
 
Panel B ( Short > 90th percentile) 
 Raw Ret. α t-value SUE ABR. 
Instown 1 -0.71 -0.93 2.17 -0.29 -0.24 
 0.37 -0.20 -1.09 -0.06 -0.04 
Instown 3 0.78 -0.21 -1.46 0.25 0.03 
3 – 1 1.49   0.54 0.27 
t-value 2.64   11.50 7.05 
 
Panel C 
  Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) 
 Instown 1    Instown 5 
Short 1 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.26 
 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.44 
 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.36 0.47 
 -0.04 -0.05 0.13 0.27 0.40 
Short 5 -0.18 -0.25 -0.14 0.06 0.36 
1 - 5 0.24 0.30 0.21 0.06 -0.10 
t-value 4.03 5.21 3.12 1.51 -1.46 
 
Panel D 
Mean Daily Abnormal Returns Around Earnings Announcements (ABR) 
 Instown 1    Instown 5  
Short 1 0.32 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.16  
 0.23 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.03  
 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02  
 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.04  
Short 5 -0.22 -0.21 -0.09 0.01 0.05  
1 - 5 0.64 0.39 0.22 0.11 0.11  
t-value 7.69 6.86 4.16 2.62 1.83  
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demonstrates, the return predictability of short interest seems to come from value 
relevant information short sellers have.   
A short sale can be the result of a merger arbitrage, convertible arbitrage, tax 
saving strategy (shorting against the box), or an effort to profit from overpriced stocks. 
The literature provides considerable evidence of informed short selling. Desai et al. 
(2004) find that short sellers start taking positions in firms, which have earnings 
restatements two years before the restatement announcement. After the restatement, they 
cover their positions. Desai et al. (2004) show that the increase in short interest is more 
pronounced for firms with higher accruals. Francis et al. (2005) also argues that short 
sellers target firms where the market has overestimated the fundamentals. They show that 
analysts revise their forecasts downward following an unexpected increase in short 
interest. Nevertheless, the informativeness of short sales might vary with the level of 
institutional ownership. As Boehmer and Kelley (2006) suggest if institutional investors 
enhance price efficiency, short sellers might have limited profitable opportunities to 
exploit when institutional ownership is high. Moreover, short interest might be more 
informative when institutional ownership is low since Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) 
suggest that the pool of short sales would be more informative when it’s harder to borrow 
shares. Both of these arguments strengthen the idea that short interest level is more 
informative about future firm performance and return predictability is stronger when 
institutional ownership is low.  
Table XIV Panel C and D show results consistent with this idea. Each quarter, I 
first sort stocks into five portfolios based on institutional ownership, each portfolio then 
is sorted into additional five portfolios based on short interest. Time-series means of SUE 
and abnormal returns around the first earnings announcement in the future for each 
portfolio is reported. An investigation of Panel C and D reveals that short interest predicts 
more negative earnings surprises when institutional ownership is low. For example, while 
among low institutional ownership stocks a hedge portfolio between high short interest 
and low short interest stocks experience 0.64% (t-value 6.79) market reaction during the 
first future earnings announcement, a similar hedge portfolio among high institutional 
ownership stocks experience 0.11% (t-value 1.43). The comparisons are very similar with 
respect to standardized unexpected earnings, SUE. Short interest seems to be better able  
 46
Table XV 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
Size, BM, Short, and Instown are calculated as described in Table I. MOM is the mean return performance 
over the past 12 months. SUE, standardized unexpected earnings is unexpected earnings (the change in 
quarterly earnings per share from quarter t-4 to quarter t) divided by the standard deviation of unexpected 
earnings over the last eight quarters. Ann. Ret is the mean daily abnormal return around earnings 
announcement date, [-2,+1] where t=0 is the announcement date. Ret – Rf is the excess stock return after 
subtracting the return on one-month T-Bill. Dependent variables are SUE, ABR, and Ret – Rf. Each month, 
independent variables are transformed into decile ranks, which are then standardized to take values between 
zero and one. Cross-sectional regressions are run each month, and time-series averages of the coefficient 
estimates are reported. T-stats in parentheses are calculated according to robust standard errors.  
 
 SUE ABR. Ret – Rf 
Intercept -0.001 0.256 -0.121 
 (-0.07) (4.92) (-0.14) 
Size 0.234 -0.383 -1.430 
 (3.53) (-9.19) (-1.98) 
Bm -1.089 0.107 1.937 
 (-21.26) (2.94) (3.10) 
MOM 1.452 0.236 2.036 
 (34.94) (8.70) (3.05) 
Short -0.720 -0.497 -2.224 
 (-14.73) (-9.75) (-2.76) 
Short*Instown 0.403 0.502 2.241 
 (7.08) (9.01) (3.23) 
Average R2 8.9% 0.9% 3.7% 
 
to predict value relevant company news when institutional ownership is low. And, this 
predictive ability is reflected in future total returns, consistent with information 
argument. A similar study is done by Reed (2003) who looks at the relationship between 
the absolute value of earnings announcement price reactions and short selling costs. He 
finds that stocks with high short selling constraints have larger price reactions to earnings 
announcements especially for bad news. A major difference with this paper is that Reed 
(2003) investigates the absolute value of the earnings surprise not the sign of the surprise. 
Actually, he finds that shorting costs can not predict future earnings surprises, which is 
consistent with the arguments in this paper. 
Table XV is a more formal presentation of the portfolio approach. I conduct 
Fama-McBeth regressions of stock returns, SUE, and announcement abnormal returns on 
short interest and some control variables to examine short interest’s predictive ability. 
Each month, independent variables are transformed into decile ranks, which are then 
standardized to take values between zero and one. This transformation makes the 
interpretation of the coefficients more intuitive and comparable across variables. Cross-
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sectional regressions are run each month, and time-series averages of the coefficient 
estimates are reported in Table XV. The regression results in Table XV are consistent 
with the earlier results using portfolio analysis. Short interest predicts subsequent returns 
and earnings announcement surprises, and this predictability decreases with institutional 
ownership. For example, the coefficient estimate for short interest is -2.22% (t-value -
2.76). This means that return differential between the highest and lowest short interest 
stocks is -2.22% per month when institutional ownership is the lowest. However, 
considering the interaction term between short interest and institutional ownership, this 
differential approaches zero (-2.224 + 2.241 = 0.017%) when institutional ownership is 
the highest. Similarly, short interest’s predictive power for future earning surprises 
decreases with institutional ownership. When institutional ownership is in its lowest 
level, stocks with the highest short interest experience -0.497%  (t-value -9.75) during the 
first future announcement, but this figure approaches to zero (-0.497 + 0.502 = 0.005%) 
when institutional ownership is the highest.  
The regression results confirm the conclusions from the earlier double sorts: 
predictive power of short interest in terms of predicting future returns and earnings 
surprises varies with institutional ownership. It becomes stronger when institutional 
ownership is low. 
Finally, for robustness checks I examine return predictability of short interest 
using a subsample of stocks, which have lower short sale costs. D’Avolio (2002) reports 
that the vast majority of hard to borrow stocks (where short sale costs are greater than 1% 
per year) are either in the bottom size decile or have prices less than $5. Therefore, I 
repeat the analysis excluding those firms from the sample. The stocks in the remaining 
sample are presumed to have relatively lower short sale costs. Table XVI Panel A and B 
demonstrate that the results are strikingly similar with those of the full sample. Short 
interest seems to be informative in terms of future total returns and earnings 
announcements, and this informativeness is stronger when institutional ownership is 
lower. Overall results of this paper is also consistent with Cohen et al. (2005) who show 
that while an increase in shorting demand predicts negative abnormal returns of 2.54% in 
the subsequent month, a decrease in shorting supply does not have a significant 
predictability. They suggest that the return predictability associated with shorting is much  
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Table XVI 
Subsample Analysis 
This table shows the short interest, and mean returns of portfolios sorted on short interest.  
The sample contains NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks during the period from January 1988 to December 
2002. Stocks with price less than $5 or stocks in the lowest size decile are excluded from the sample. The 
variables are defined as in Table I and Table V.  Panel A reports short interest (Short), mean monthly stock 
returns (Raw Ret.), and four-factor adjusted abnormal stock returns (α) for portfolios sorted on short 
interest. Panel B reports time-series averages of coefficients estimated from monthly cross-sectional 
regressions. T-stats in parentheses are calculated according to robust standard errors.  
 
Panel A 
 Short Raw Ret. α t-value 
P1 (low) 0.004 1.29 0.48 3.04 
 0.029 1.42 0.52 3.54 
 0.095 1.46 0.40 2.73 
 0.214 1.21 0.21 2.08 
 0.388 1.09 0.05 0.61 
 0.631 0.95 -0.06 -0.77 
 0.988 1.00 0.03 0.41 
 1.572 0.85 -0.08 0.80 
 2.814 0.54 -0.32 -2.51 
P10 (high) 8.551 0.24 -0.59 -3.49 
P1 – P10 8.547 1.05 -1.07 -5.56 
 
 
Panel B 
 SUE ABR. Ret – Rf 
Intercept 0.056 -0.007 -0.75 
 (1.61) (-0.34) (-1.09) 
Size 0.511 -0.148 -0.05 
 (11.51) (-4.05) (-0.12) 
Bm -1.089 0.079 1.06 
 (-27.47) (2.52) (1.98) 
MOM 1.545 0.206 2.44 
 (31.35) (8.19) (5.07) 
Short -0.912 -0.302 -1.79 
 (-14.75) (-8.20) (-3.07) 
Short*Instown 0.451 0.325 1.38 
 (7.31) (9.39) (2.91) 
Average R2 10.25% 0.83% 4.98% 
 
greater than the costs of shorting and that the relationship between shorting market and 
subsequent returns may not be due to market frictions but due to information revelation 
into stock prices. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study I present confirming evidence for the negative relationship between 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and subsequent stock returns. Earlier research interpret 
this result being inconsistent with the notion that divergence of opinions is a proxy for 
risk, and consistent with the idea that, in the presence of short sale constraints, optimists 
may cause overpricing, which leads to lower subsequent returns while prices get 
corrected, an argument borrowed from Miller (1977). While heterogeneous beliefs and 
short sale constraints may be important for asset pricing, I try to demonstrate an 
alternative mechanism based on analysts’ behaviors, which makes it possible to observe a 
negative relationship between dispersion of forecasts and subsequent stock returns.  
In the first part of the paper, I examine whether prices move in the same direction 
what Miller (1977) predicts when dispersion of forecasts is used to proxy for divergence 
of opinions in the market. Miller (1977) asserts that differences of opinion exacerbate 
overpricing since the prices will reflect optimistic view whenever pessimists are 
restricted from the market. A testable prediction of this argument is that when differences 
of opinion increase, prices increase, i.e. there should be positive correlation between 
stock returns and changes in dispersion of opinions. I show that prices, in fact, move in 
the opposite direction of this prediction since stocks, which experience increase in 
dispersion earn lower returns.  
 Furthermore, analysts’ biased behaviors in updating their forecasts seem to 
explain the negative relation between dispersion of forecasts and stock returns. Some 
analysts exhibit reluctance to revise their forecasts downward quickly either due to 
investment banking relationships with the firm or the effort to maintain good relations 
with the firm management to have access to private information. Since some analysts fail 
to quickly downgrade poorly performing stocks and wait for additional confirmation of 
poor performance before revising their estimates while others don’t, forecasts would be 
more dispersed for stocks with recent poor performance. Additionally, because of the 
sluggish response, the change in the consensus estimate would be insufficient. This 
biased behavior against negative news need not be an irrational behavior for analysts but 
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instead it can be considered to be in line with their incentive structures because brokerage 
houses generally favor optimistic analysts. Indeed, this paper demonstrates that firms 
with recent poor performance have higher dispersion of forecasts compared to others. 
Moreover, dispersion of forecasts increases during the period when there is poor 
performance. 
 As indicated above, high dispersion may be correlated with incomplete revision of 
the consensus estimate for poorly performing firms. If investors follow a particular 
analyst or the consensus estimate, they may fail to correct for this bias. Sluggish response 
of some analysts to bad news manifests itself as dispersion of forecasts, so the 
observation of dispersed forecasts following poor performance hints that prices may not 
reflect the recent information in a timely fashion, and therefore predict lower returns. In 
this respect, the explanation for the dispersion effect in this paper is conditional on bad 
news which consequently suggests that dispersion effect should be more pronounced for 
firms with recent poor performance. This paper empirically demonstrates that the return 
differential between high dispersion and low dispersion stocks is most pronounced 
among loser stocks. High dispersion stocks do not significantly underperform low 
dispersion stocks unless the recent performance is poor. Moreover, cross-sectional 
regressions of returns provide confirmatory evidence by showing that the interaction 
variable between dispersion and recent earnings performance is significantly negative, 
which also suggest that the dispersion effect is most pronounced for firms with recent bad 
news.  
 Although short sale restrictions might impede the flow of all available 
information in the marketplace into prices, and therefore result in temporary mispricing, 
the findings in this paper suggest that empirical observations using analysts’ forecast 
dispersion to proxy divergence of opinions may be significantly affected by the bias in 
analysts’ forecast revisions. Since some analysts’ reluctant response to bad news may 
lead to dispersion in forecasts, empirical results of the papers that use analysts’ forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty or heterogeneity of beliefs must be interpreted 
cautiously. Moreover, if forecasts are dispersed after bad news, investors may want to 
stay away from such firms as the price adjustment for the bad news could continue. Even 
though our results do not show that differences of opinion may be a proxy for risk, 
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differentiating between information differences and interpretation differences as two 
reasons for differences of opinion is another research avenue to disentangle the effects of 
differences of opinion on stock returns. 
In the second chapter of the study, I find that, like Asquith et al. (2005), high short 
interest stocks earn more negative abnormal returns when institutional ownership is low. 
Asquith et al. (2005) suggest that stocks with high short interest and low institutional 
ownership are short sale constrained and that the return predictability is caused by high 
short selling costs, which holds negative opinions off from the market consistent with 
Miller (1977). The findings in this paper demonstrate that the reason of the return 
predictability may also be consistent with an information argument. 
First, I show that increasing institutional ownership (a proxy for short selling 
constraints used by Asquith et al. (2005)) does not exacerbate overpricing. Second, I 
demonstrate that short interest is informative in regards to not only future total returns but 
also future earnings surprises. Moreover, this informativeness is greater when 
institutional ownership is lower. The results are consistent with the following argument: 
if shorting costs work as a filter to drive out relatively uninformed short sales, the 
resulting short interest would be more informative in a high cost environment. The results 
taken together suggest that short sellers are sophisticated investors who have value 
relevant information about firms and position themselves in stocks where expected future 
returns are lower. 
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